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ABSTRACT

Congress created the Federal Circuit, in part, to provide uniformity in patent
decisions throughout the United States and stability in patent law. During the first
decade of the Federal Circuit's existence, the Supreme Court largely deferred to the
Federal Circuit in patent law decisions. However, the Supreme Court's initial
deference to the Federal Circuit has since been replaced by a critical view of the
Federal Circuit's decisions and its decision-making processes. This article proposes
that the Supreme Court has correctly abandoned its deferential mindset toward the
Federal Circuit since the Federal Circuit was never intended to be the de facto
Supreme Court for patent issues.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created on
October 1, 1982.1
Congress justified creation of the new Federal Circuit by
identifying four areas in which the federal court system needed improvement. The
new court would fill a void in the judicial system by creating an appellate forum
capable of exercising nationwide jurisdiction over appeals in areas of the law where
Congress determined there was a special need for nationwide uniformity. 2 Congress
also recognized a need to improve the administration of patent law by centralizing
appeals in patent cases, 3 and providing an upgraded and better-organized trial forum
for other government cases. 4 A final stimulus toward creation of the new court was
the overwhelming workload of the Supreme Court, which prevented that Court from
effectively addressing specific issues of national importance, such as patent law
uniformity. 5 Those types of issues could instead be routed to a new Federal Circuit,
which would be able to provide "reasonably quick and definitive answers to legal
6
questions of nationwide significance."
With this Congressional mandate in hand, the Federal Circuit set out to carve
its place in history. The early part of the Federal Circuit's life may be viewed as its
"honeymoon" period with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court rarely reviewed
patent decisions from the Federal Circuit, and those it did review were generally
given extreme deference. More recently, an increasingly troubled relationship has
developed between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit. The Supreme
Court's initial deference to the Federal Circuit has been replaced by a more critical
view of the Federal Circuit's decisions and its decision-making processes. The
Supreme Court also dramatically altered the relationship when it opened the door to
a greater role for the regional circuit courts of appeal, thus overturning a twenty-year
virtual monopoly for the Federal Circuit in patent law appellate jurisdiction. This
paper will examine the changing relationship between the Supreme Court and
Federal Circuit in patent law jurisprudence over the last twenty years, and conclude
that the Supreme Court has correctly abandoned its deferential mindset toward the
'© 2003 Debra D. Peterson. The author is an International Trade Specialist for the United
States Bureau of Customs and Border Protection. J.D. Candidate 2003, Chapman University School
of Law. All views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection.
1 Pub. L. No. 97-164, Stat. 25 (1982).
2 S. REP. No. 97-275, at 2 (1981).

:3
Id.
4 Id.

5 Id. at 3. "The Supreme Court now appears to be operating at-or close to-full capacity;
therefore, in the future the Court cannot be expected to provide much more guidance in legal issues
than it now does. Yet the number and complexity of unsettled controversies in the law continues to
grow." Id.

(3Id.
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Federal Circuit because that lower court was never intended to be the de facto
Supreme Court for patent issues.

II. A BROKERED MARRIAGE: THE ROCKY ROAD TOWARD CREATION OF THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Concerns about the uniformity of United States patent decisions and the
stability of patent law were two of the main factors underlying creation of the
Federal Circuit.7 The U.S. patent system, which allows society to benefit from
inventions, has itself been termed an invention.8 Language in the U.S. Constitution
giving Congress the power to grant private property rights to individual inventors
was a significant departure from the European system of granting monopolies to
royal favorites. 9 In order to implement the new U.S. patent system, Congress created
three institutions.10 Congress first created a body of patent law, now codified in
Chapter 35 of the United States Code. 1 Second, Congress created the Patent and
Trademark Office to administer patents.1 2 Finally, Congress created federal courts
and empowered them to enforce valid patents, destroy invalid patents, and determine
13
whether or not a patent has been infringed.
The sheer number of federal courts involved in patent law jurisprudence led
eventually, and probably inevitably, to uniformity problems. Before creation of the
Federal Circuit, appeals from decisions of federal district courts were directed to
their regional U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. 1Decisions
in any of the eleven regional
circuits were not binding on the other circuits. 4 Federal appellate courts were found
7Id.
8 HOWARD T. MARKEY, HOWARD T. MARKEY ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A COMPILATION OF
His WRITINGS, OPINIONS, AND SPEECHES 1663 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1998). The truth of this
observation is debatable. Early United States patent law was largely modeled on English patent
law. See generally 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS 15 n.3 (1890). However, early
judicial attitudes toward patents in the United States differed from the English patent law. See
GEORGE T. CURTIS, THE LAW OF PATENTS xxxvi-xxxvii (1849); WILLARD PHILLIPS, LAW OF PATENTS
27, 55-59 (1837). The practice of granting patent monopolies to royal favorites had been largely
cleared up after the Statute of Monopolies, enacted during the reign of James I. 21 Jac. I, ch. 3
(1624) (Eng.). See ROBINSON, at 6-12. See generally Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti
Monopoly Origins of the Patent & Copyright Clause, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 909 (Dec.
2002) (providing a historical discussion of British and early American experiences with patent law).
9 MARKEY, supra note 8, at 1663. The Constitution authorizes Congress to enact laws to
"promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and
inventors the exclusive rights to their writings and discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
10S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 3.
11 Id. Federal patent statutes have existed in the United States since 1793. MARKEY, supra
note 8, at 1680.
12 S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 3 (1981). The mission of the Patent and Trademark Office is to
promote industrial and technological progress in the United States and strengthen the national
economy by administering the laws relating to patents and trademarks, and advising the Secretary
of Commerce, the President of the United States, and the administration on patent, trademark, and
copyright protection, and trade-related aspects of intellectual property. Patent and Trademark
Mission,
United
States
Patent
and
Trademark
Office,
at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/mission.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
13 S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 3.
14

Id.
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to reach inconsistent decisions on the same issues, or to apply the law unevenly, thus
leading to a variety of legal problems, including rampant forum shopping. 15 In
addition, the federal system lacked a mechanism to provide quick and definitive
answers to legal questions of nationwide significance. 16 Non-uniformity also existed
between the courts and the Patent and Trademark Office. By 1966, the Supreme
Court had observed a "notorious difference" between the standards of patentability
17
applied by the Patent and Trademark Office and those applied by the courts.
Other factors contributing to the creation of the Federal Circuit included an
overworked Supreme Court 18 and a faltering U.S. economy.1 9 The issue of Supreme
Court workload was linked to the appellate court uniformity issue. Since the
Supreme Court was operating at virtual "full capacity,"20 the justices had no time to
sort out uniformity problems in the eleven regional circuits. 21 The workload problem
prompted Chief Justice Burger in 1971 to appoint a Study Group led by Professor
Paul A. Freund. 22 The Freund Commission recommended creation of a National
Court of Appeals to screen cases where Supreme Court review was sought, approving
some cases for Supreme Court review, and deciding other cases itself.23 The National
24
Court of Appeals would be composed of circuit judges borrowed from other courts.
25
This controversial proposal eventually died by reason of "congressional inertia."
In 1972, Congress itself stepped up to the plate and created a commission to
study the entire federal appellate court system and make recommendations for
change. 26 The Commission on the Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System
was led by Senator Roman L. Hruska. 27 As part of its mandate, the Hruska
Commission undertook an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of creating a
28
specialized court designed to hear only patent appeals.
The idea of a specialized patent court was not new. The first proposal for a
specialized patent court had come in 1887, and similar calls continued into the
15Id.

1 Id.
17

Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966).

See generally MARTIN SHAPIRO, THE

SUPREME COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 164-69 (Free Press 1968) (discussing reasons for
the different standards between the Patent and Trademark Office and the courts).
18 S. REP.No.97-275, at 3.
19Pauline Newman, Origins of the FederalCircuit.*The Role of Industry 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 3,
541 (2001).
20 S.REP. No. 97-275, at. 3.
21 Id.
22 THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT - ORIGINS, THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT - A HISTORY 1982-1990, at 3 (Marion T.
Bennett ed., 1991) [hereinafter Bennett].
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Robert Desmond, Nothing Seems "Obvious" to the Court of Appeals for the FederalCircuit:
The Federal Circuit, Unchecked by the Supreme Court, Transforms the Standard of Obviousness
Under the PatentLaw,26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 455, 458 (1993).
27 Act of Oct. 13, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807 (1972), amended by,Pub. L. No. 93-420, 88

Stat. 1153 (1974) [hereinafter Pub. L. No. 92-489]. The Hruska Commission was composed of four
members appointed by the President, four by the Chief Justice, four by the Senate, and four by the
House of Representatives. The Executive Director of the Commission was Professor A. Leo Levin of
the University of Pennsylvania Law School. Bennett, supra note 22, at 3.
28 Pub. L. No. 92-489.
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twentieth century. 29 The findings of the Hruska Commission seemed to justify
creation of a specialized patent court, especially the Commission's conclusion that the
30
current federal appellate system was unable to adjudicate issues of national law.
The Commission's findings also confirmed that uncertainty in the law led to forum
shopping among the circuits, with the most intense forum shopping occurring in the
31
area of patent law.

Despite these findings, the Hruska Commission decided against supporting a
specialized court for patent appeals. 32 The Hruska Commission identified six
inherent disadvantages of specialized courts. 33 These included fears that specialized
justices would become subject to tunnel vision, or would impose their own views of
policy. The Commission was also concerned that specialized justices would have a
reduced incentive to produce thorough and persuasive opinions, would suffer from
diminished exposure to varied areas of the law; and would be at increased risk of
being captured by special interest groups. A final fear was that a specialized court
would dilute or eliminate regional influence. Instead of a specialized patent court,
the Hruska Commission recommended the formation of a National Court of Appeals
to decide issues of national importance.34 Unfortunately, the Hruska Commission's
proposal suffered the same terminal fate as the Freund Committee's
recommendation.

35

Although some frustrated observers felt that attempts to make a "[siystematic
change to improve the judicial machinery seemed to be going nowhere," 36 various
efforts at improving the federal system were finally beginning to coalesce. In 1977,
the Department of Justice appointed Professor Daniel J. Meador of the University of
Virginia as Assistant Attorney General for the Office for Improvements in the
Administration of Justice. 37 On July 21, 1978, Professor Meador proposed a
restructuring of the federal court system that would include a new circuit with
nationwide jurisdiction of all appeals covering the subject matter assigned to it,

Jack Q. Lever, Jr., The New CourtofAppeals for the FederalCircuit (Pt.I), 64 J. PAT. &
SOCY 178, 186-91 (1982).
'30Bennett, supranote 22, at 5-8.
31 Id. at 15.
32 Id. at 30.
'33
Id. at 28-30. Congress had struggled once before with the idea of a specialized court. In
1910, Congress created the Commerce Court to hear appeals from the Interstate Commerce
Commission. The main issues facing the court involved the development of U.S. railroads. After
only three years of existence, the new Commerce Court was abolished. Its demise in October 1913
was attributed to two main factors: it did not have the support of the major parties involved in
resolution of railroad issues, and it lacked "judicial insulation" to protect it from institutional
attacks. Desmond, supra note 26, at 455. Congress has also created temporary specialized courts to
handle unforeseen problems, such as the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals, or the Special
Court under the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973. Bennett, supra note 22, at 13 n.17.
'3Bennett, supranote 22, at 15.
3 Id.at 4.
36 Id. at 5.
37 Id.
Professor Meador served as Assistant Attorney General in the U.S. Department of
Justice from 1977-79, heading the Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice. Daniel
J. Meador, Retrospective on the Federal Circuit: The First 20 Years - A Historical View, 11 FED.
CiR.B.J. 3, 531 (2001).
21)See

TRADEMARK OFF.
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including civil tax, environmental and patent cases.38 Meador's proposal initially
languished, however, having faced powerful opposition from the tax and
39
environmental law bars.
Meador's proposal may have been temporarily stalled, but the goal of a
restructured federal court system remained alive.
Concerns in 1978 over the
suffering U.S. economy prompted President Carter to convene a "Domestic Policy
Review," which was a joint government-industry committee searching out remedies
for the nation's recession. 40 Because technology-based (and thus patent-based)
industries enjoyed the only favorable balance of trade at that time, the committee's
main purpose was to provide incentives to those industries. 41 One major incentive
would be a restructured federal court system that was more uniform in its treatment
of patent issues. The committee felt that most judges did not understand the patent
system and its importance to the U.S. economy, and that this attitude was helping to
perpetrate rampant forum shopping. 42 Judges at the appellate court level were also
43
viewed by some as revolutionaries bent on reinventing the patent system.
Professor Meador's proposal then resurfaced, having been revamped to exclude
44
the more controversial subject matter, such as tax and environmental law.
38 Meador, supra note 37, at 531. Professor Meador proposed the merger of the appellate
functions of the seven-judge United States Court of Claims, the five-judge United States Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, plus three additional judges, into a new fifteen-judge circuit court of
appeals.

The new court would have the appellate jurisdiction of its two predecessor courts, plus

exclusive appellate jurisdiction in civil tax, environmental and patent cases, and from the district
courts. Id.
3 Newman, supra note 19, at 531.
40Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 542.

The statistics of patents in court were such that no patent could be counted on to
survive litigation. Forum shopping was rampant, for some courts hadn't ever
sustained a patent, and bragged about it. And the Supreme Court held that you
could attack the same patent in court after court, until it finally fell.
Id.
43 MARKEY, suprn note 8, at 1663. Judge Markey suggested several reasons for this judicial

attitude:
I know of no definitive study of the causes for the treatment of patents in the
courts of appeals from the 1930s through the 1950s. The widespread substitution
of the pejorative "monopoly" as the name for a patentee's property right appears a
contributing cause. The illegitimately asserted conflict between the patent laws
and the antitrust laws was another. The perceived shortcomings of the ex-parte
examination in the Patent Office was doubtless an influence. The reliance on
slogans and disregard of the statute in lawyers' briefs and court opinions appears
to have been both cause and effect, leading judges to make decisions based not on
whether the invention in light of all the evidence complied with the statute
governing patentability but on whether the judge personally thought the product
in suit was 'and [sic] invention.'
It is not surprising that such reinventing of the
system at the court level produced results that were equally bad - valid patents
being declared invalid and invalid patents being declared valid - which in turn
produced disrespect for and reduced use of the system.
Id.at 1664.
44 Newman, supra note 19, at 543. Professor Meador was assisted by Professor Maurie
Rosenberg of the Columbia Law School. Soo Donald R. Dunner, Refloetions on tho Foundingofthe
Federal Circuit,11 FED. CIR. B.J. 3, 546 (2001); Meador, supra note 37, at 560.
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Meador's plans to restructure the federal court system found a receptive ear in
Senator Edward Kennedy, who would soon be assuming the chairmanship of the
Senate Judiciary Committee. 45 One of Senator Kennedy's short-term goals was to
develop a package of court improvement proposals. 46 Kennedy accepted Meador's
idea of creating the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, with patent
47
appeals jurisdiction over district courts.
Since Senator Kennedy's short-term goals also seemed to include challenging
President Carter in the upcoming Democratic primaries, the Carter administration
was sensitive to any moves by Kennedy that might take the spotlight off the
President. 48 As a result, Professor Meador's revised proposal also found itself being
49
warmly embraced by President Carter and the Domestic Policy Review committee.
In a special message to Congress on February 27, 1979, President Carter "urged that
Congress establish the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit on the
same tier as the existing courts of appeal." 50 Senator Kennedy was present at the
51
President's announcement and declared his support for the restructuring plan.
The Administration's bill was introduced by Senator Edward Kennedy and
Senator Dennis DeConcini. 52 A broader bill was introduced in the Senate by Senator
Kennedy, while Congressman Peter Rodino, Jr. proposed a separate bill in the House
of Representatives. 53 Senate hearings were held and a bill was passed on October 30,
1979. 5 4 Because the bill contained a controversial amendment that would have
reversed the judicial presumption in law that an agency rule or regulation was valid,
the bill was not considered in the House. 55 The House passed a separate bill on
September 15, 1980,56 but Congress was unable to work out a compromise on the
controversial amendment language in the Senate Bill. 5 7 The legislation died at the
58
end of the 96th Congress.
Despite some concerns that the change in administration in 1980 might lead to
different priorities in the federal agenda, it was soon apparent that the 97th
Congress was also ready to take up the issue of federal court reform. 59 New bills
were introduced and additional hearings were held. 60 Differences between the
Senate and House were ultimately resolved, and a bill was presented for President

45Meador, supra note 37, at 560.
46 Id.
47 Id.

48

Id.

49Dunner, supranote 44, at 546.

50Bennett, supranote 22, at 4.
51Meador, supra note 37, at 560.
52 Bennett, supranote 22, at 5.
5:3Jd.
54 Id.
S.1477 passed the Senate by unanimous consent on October 30, 1979. S. REP. No. 97275, at 1.
55 Bennett, supranote 22, at 6.
56 Id. H.R. No. 3806 passed the House on the suspension calendar by voice vote on Sept. 15,

1980. S. REP. NO. 97-725 at 2.
57 Bennett,

supranote 22, at 6.

5S Id.
59Id.

(30
S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 2.
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Reagan's signature in March 1982.61 At a Rose Garden ceremony on April 2, 1982,
President Reagan signed into law the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982.62 As
the Rose Garden was bathed in a respectful silence, an unknown guest was heard to
63
murmur that "this brokered marriage is about to be consummated."
When the dust finally settled in 1982, what had actually been created? The
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 did not create a "specialized court," as was
made explicitly clear by the Federal Circuit's jurisdictional statutes, the Act's
legislative history, 64 and the emphatic declarations of two Chief Judges of the
Federal Circuit. 65
The Federal Circuit could more properly be called an
"experimental court" in the sense that it is a circuit court with national jurisdiction.
In creating the Federal Circuit, Congress sought to bring about uniformity of
decisions in certain critical areas of the law without the need for Supreme Court
review to resolve conflicts between circuits. 66 In order to achieve that goal, the
Federal Circuit was given exclusive jurisdiction over specific areas of the law. First
of all, the new court had jurisdiction over appeals from all district courts in cases
arising under the patent laws 67 and the Tucker Act. 68 The Federal Circuit also
replaced the 127 year-old United States Court of Claims and the 73 year-old United
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 69 and became the reviewing court for
the U.S. Court of International Trade and the U.S. International Trade
61Bennett, supra note 22, at 8. The Bill passed the House on March 9, 1982, and the Senate on
March 22, 1982. S. REP. No. 97-275, at 1.
62 Id.
The law was effective on Oct. 1, 1982. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
6 Meador, supra note 37, at 561.
(4 S. REP. No. 97-275 at 6.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit will not be a 'specialized court,' as
that term is normally used. The court's jurisdiction will not be limited to one type
of case, or even to two or three types of cases. Rather, it will have a varied docket
scanning a broad range of legal issues and types of cases.
Id. The nation's only prior experiment with a specialized federal court was the Commerce Court,
and that experiment was generally regarded as unsuccessful. See infra text accompanying note 33.
Despite the problems with the Commerce Court, and the disadvantages of specialized courts, as
articulated by the Hruska Commission, some commentators have called for a specialized Copyright
Court. Soo gne-rally Michael Landau & Donald E. Biederman, The Case for a Specialized Copyright
Court. Eliminatingthe JurisdictionalAdvantage, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 717 (1999).
(35See Howard T. Markey, The Federal Circuit and CongressionalIntent, 41 AM. U. L. REV.
577, 578 (1992) ("early assumptions that the Federal Circuit would somehow be more 'specialized'
than regional circuits appear to have been abandoned - and rightly so"); Helen Wilson Nies,
Dissents at the FederalCircuit and Supreme CourtReview, 45 AM.U. L. REV. 1519, 1519 (1996) ("in
enacting our primary jurisdiction-granting statute, Congress made clear that it was not creating a
'specialized court,' and it specified widely divergent areas of law or tribunals over which we exercise
exclusive appellate jurisdiction").
(3 Helen W. Nies, Forewordto THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT -A HISTORY 1982-1990, at xi (Marion T. Bennett ed., 1991).
(37
U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 8. Congress was given the power to secure to authors and
inventors the exclusive right to their writings and discoveries. Id. See gene-rallyinfraPart III.D.2
(discussing when cases are considered to "arise under" the patent laws).
(3 As defined by Judge Markey, the "the little Tucker Act" covered claims against the
government for less than ten thousand dollars. Howard T. Markey, Technology, The Law and the
Courts, 50 ALB. L. REV. 399 (1986).
(9Howard T. Markey, The Phoeni± Court, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 1. Those predecessor courts
have been described as "simply overtaken by changing circumstances before being consigned to the
dust bin of history." Bennett, supra note 22, at 1.
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Commission.7 0 As such, the Federal Circuit inherited review of issues that ran the
gamut from importing and exporting to antidumping investigations to personal
monetary grievances against the government.7 1 In fact, at its creation in 1982, the
72
new court was given "virtually exclusive jurisdiction" over 114 trial tribunals,
73
which represented more tribunals than any other circuit.

III. THE HONEYMOON: INITIAL SUPREME COURT DEFERENCE TO THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT

A. Federal CircuitJudges'Expertisein PatentLaw
During the first decade of the Federal Circuit's existence, the Supreme Court
largely deferred to the Federal Circuit in patent law decisions. The main reason for
this deference was the acknowledged patent law expertise of the original Federal
Circuit judges.
At its creation in 1982, the Federal Circuit inherited a team of bright, welltrained and technically-oriented judges from the U.S. Court of Claims and the U.S.
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.7 4 The first Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit,
Howard T. Markey, boasted that he had "the finest staff and the most distinguished
judges one could ask for." 75 According to Markey, the first twelve judges to the
Federal Circuit brought a combined total of 250 years of distinguished judicial
service.7 6 Almost half of these original Federal Circuit judges had served on the
predecessor Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 77 and were therefore relatively
well-acquainted with the complexities of patent law. It would be fair to say that the
Federal Circuit began business with the best possible collection of judges then
78
available in the country.

B. Supreme CourtPerception of PatentLaw
The Supreme Court has historically had an uneasy relationship with patent law.
Although the Constitution allows Congress to afford patent protection to inventors,
70 Nies,

supra note 66, at xii.
Id. at xiii. These could include claims as diverse as takings cases, breaches of government
contracts, claims for tax refunds, mismanagement of Indian lands, vaccine injury compensation
71

claims, monies payable under various government programs, or garnishment of government wages
for alimony and child support. Id.
72 MARKEY, supra note 8, at 1665.
73 Nies, supra note 66, at xiii.
71Desmond, supra note 26, at 486 (citing H.R. 205, at 1).
75MARKEY, supra note 8, at 1719.
76Id. at 1720.
77 The original Federal Circuit judges who had previously served on the U.S. Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals included Judges Markey (former Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals), Rich, Baldwin, Miller and Almond. See generallyBennett, supra note 22, at 17-97.
78 Desmond, supra note 26, at 486.
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the Supreme Court, by the mid-twentieth century, was viewed as increasingly "antipatent" and even downright "hostile" to patent holders.'9 The Supreme Court's
general disdain for patents during this period is illustrated by the observation of
Justice Jackson in 1949 that "the only patent that is valid is one which this Court
80
has not been able to get its hands on."
By the 1940s, the Supreme Court had established high standards to govern the
issuance of patents. In order to demonstrate its right to a patent, a "new device,
however useful it may be, must reveal the flash of creative genius[,] not merely the
skill of the calling."8 1 A new invention would not be patented unless it "reached the
level of inventive genius which the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, authorizes Congress to
reward."8 2 The Supreme Court's attitude toward patents during this time period can
be summarized in a statement from Justice Douglas:
Every patent is the grant of a privilege of exacting tolls from the public.
The Framers plainly did not want those monopolies freely granted. The
invention, to justify a patent, had to serve the ends of science - to push back
the frontiers of chemistry, physics, and the like; to make a distinctive
contribution to scientific knowledge. That is why through the years the
opinions of the Court commonly have taken "inventive genius" as the test.
It is not enough that an article is new and useful. The Constitution never
sanctioned the patenting of gadgets. Patents serve a higher end - the
advancement of science. An invention need not be as startling as an atomic
bomb to be patentable. But is [sic] has to be of such quality and distinction
that masters of the scientific field in which it falls will recognize it as an
advance.83
The early- to mid-twentieth century hostility of Supreme Court justices toward
patents was not a new phenomenon.
Supreme Court opinions during this time
period were fond of quoting Justice Bradley's words from 1883:
It was never the object of those laws to grant a monopoly for every trifling
device, every shadow of a shade of an idea, which would naturally and
spontaneously occur to any skilled mechanic or operator in the ordinary
progress of manufactures. Such an indiscriminate creation of exclusive
privileges tends rather to obstruct than to stimulate invention. It creates a
class of speculative schemers who make it their business to watch the
advancing wave of improvement, and gather its foam in the form of
patented monopolies, which enable them to lay a heavy tax upon the
industry of the country, without contributing anything to the real
advancement of the arts. It embarrasses the honest pursuit of business

79Id. at 468.
80 Jungerson v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
81 Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941).
82 Id.
83 Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950) (Douglas,
J., concurring).
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with fears and apprehensions of concealed liens and unknown liabilities to
84
lawsuits and vexatious accountings for profits made in good faith.
Even if the Court had wanted to involve itself in every patent dispute, it did not
have the luxury of time to do so. As noted above, one of the main reasons driving
creation of the Federal Circuit was the overwhelming workload of the Supreme
Court. 85 With the new appellate court's debut in 1982, the Supreme Court seemed

ready to allow that court a more autonomous role in patent cases. Over the next few
years, the Court would sit quietly by as the new Federal Circuit ambitiously went to
work, overturning many existing Supreme Court decisions on patent law in the
process. 86 The Federal Circuit was allowed a fairly free hand in patent law decisions,
at least for the time being.

C. FederalCircuitPerception of the FederalCircuit
The Federal Circuit has always viewed itself as having a unique and special role
in federal patent law jurisprudence. The Federal Circuit's uniqueness comes from its
distinctive jurisdiction. 87 Geographically, the court has nationwide jurisdiction, but
its subject matter is exclusive to certain fields. 88 The first Chief Judge of the Federal
Circuit, Howard T. Markey, viewed this exclusivity as a two-edged sword of
"opportunity and challenge." 89 The new court had been given an opportunity to
achieve and maintain uniformity and clarity in the law, but it was faced with an
increased challenge as well, because there would be no other Circuit Courts of
Appeals to look to for competing views.90
The Federal Circuit's perception of itself as having a special role in federal
patent jurisprudence was certainly influenced by the character of its first Chief
Judge. Described by a fellow judge as "the poster boy for testosterone," 91 Markey set
81 Atl. Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1883), quoted, e.g., in Cuno, 314 U.S. at 92 (1941);
GreatAt., 340 U.S. at 155 (Douglas, J., concurring); Railroad Supply Co. v. Elyria Iron & Steel Co.,
244 U.S. 285, 293 (1917). In the same opinion, Justice Bradley added that:

The process of development in manufactures creates a constant demand for new

appliances which the skill of ordinary head workmen and engineers is generally
adequate to devise, and which, indeed, are the natural and proper outgrowth of
such development. Each step forward prepares the way for the next, and each is

usually taken by spontaneous trials and attempts in a hundred different
directions. To grant to a single party a monopoly of every slight advance made,
except where the exercise of invention somewhat above ordinary mechanical or
engineering skill is distinctly shown, is unjust in principle and injurious in its
consequences.
At]. Works, 107, U.S. at 199.
8"See supra note 5.
86 See infra note 92-94.
87MARKEY, supra note 8, at 1720.
88Id.
89 d.
90Id.
91 William C. Conner, Judge Wilam C. Conner Speaks at 2002 Spring Meeting, AMERICAN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION BULLETIN 228 (2002). Judge Conner described Markey
as a fine patent lawyer, a Brigadier General in the Air Force Reserves, and a former test pilot. He
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the stage for Federal Circuit dominance in the patent law arena. Within the first two
years of the Federal Circuit's existence, Markey authored opinions "expressly
repudiating

most of the troublesome patent rulings of the Supreme

Court." 92

Markey's actions dripped with testosterone: here was the Chief Judge of a brand new
intermediate appellate court, whose decisions were subject to review by the Supreme
Court, explicitly rejecting the law as defined by the Supreme Court. 93 Patent
attorneys nervously waited for the Supreme Court's reaction to this "effrontery," but
94
the Court tacitly approved Markey's actions by denying certiorari in each case.
Markey's inaugural actions illustrate the self-confidence and pro-active
enthusiasm of this new Chief Judge and his court. Markey had identified an
idealistic and powerful role for the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit was to be
"The Conscience of the Government," with a special role in administering justice with
dedication and diligence. 95 The new court had a "special responsibility" because it
was the probable court of last resort in most of its cases. 96 Federal Circuit judges
97
were "pioneers," and had a special responsibility to step wisely and carefully.
In Markey's view, the Federal Circuit was not trying to create a "new" or
"improved" patent system, because that role belonged to Congress. 98
Instead,
Markey viewed the work of the Federal Circuit as simply returning the patent
system to its "mooring," i.e., "to the law as set out in the statute." 99 In his opinions,
Markey continually returned to the statutory basis of U.S. patent law as the means
to facilitate the patentability of devices, and to bring consistency to decisions and

viewed Markey as "a man of strong convictions and the courage to act on them." Id. For more
details on the background of Judge Markey, see MARKEY, supra note 8, Forewordat xv.
Conner, supra note 91, at 228.
9:3Id.
92

94

Id.

9" MARKEY, supra note 8, at 41.

By "conscience," Markey did not mean that the court would
automatically decide its cases for or against the government.
[I]t is as much a matter for the
governmental conscience to know what it can and must do in meeting its duty to govern as it is to
know what it cannot in justice do." Id.
96 Howard T. Markey, The Federal Circuit and CongressionalIntent, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 577,
578 (1993).
97 MARKEY, supra note 8, at 1721.
What he perceived as wise and careful steps by Federal
Circuit judges even inspired one attorney to break into rhyme when asked to critique the Federal
Circuit at 1986's Fourth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit:
Domestic industry, the court doth seem to favor
Represent the government and success you'll savor
It's pro the agencies, on the CIT
It likes Customs, Commerce and the ITC
Not the slowest, nor the fastest,
Has it worked well? Well, just ask it.
Ah, but you want my opinion and no longer can I shirk it:
I'm in love with the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit!
Will Leonard, The First Three Years of the FederalCircuit:A Critique,The Fourth Annual Judicial
Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 112 F.R.D. 439, 461 (April
23, 1986).
98 MARKEY, supra note 8, at 1665.
99Id.
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order to the field of patent law.100 According to Edward D. Re, former Chief Judge of
the Court of International Trade, Markey probably did more in recent years to shape
patent law than anyone else had done.10 1 After stepping down from the bench,
Markey took great pride in the fact that "corrections" to Federal Circuit decisions
(either by the Federal Circuit in banc or the Supreme Court) had been kept to "an
'1 0 2
absolute minimum," and were thus viewed by Markey as clear "aberrations."

D. Supreme CourtDeferential When It DidReview Cases
The Supreme Court was extremely deferential toward the Federal Circuit when
conducting one of its rare reviews of a patent case during this time period. And
reviews of patent cases by the Supreme Court were rare: in the first ten years of the
Federal Circuit's history, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and handed down
opinions in only four cases related to patent law. 10 3 Those cases included Dennison
10 5
Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp.,10 4 Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp.,
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 10 6 and Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronie,
Inc. 10 7 Only the last case squarely raised a substantive patent law issue.108 A brief
review of each case illustrates the Court's general deference to the Federal Circuit in
patent law issues during this time period.

1. Dennison Mfg. Co.
Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., decided by the Supreme Court in 1986,
involved the issue of "obviousness" and the Federal Circuit's exercise of appellate
10 Robert Gilbert Johnston, Dean, The John Marshall Law School, Introduction to HOWARD T.
MARKEY, HOWARD T. MARKEY ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A COMPILATION OF His WRITINGS,
OPINIONS, AND SPEECHES, at xix (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1998). The Markey court eschewed
use in its opinions of loaded words that didn't appear in the statute (e.g., "monopoly"), and of slogans
that Markey felt "barnacled the law of patents." MARKEY, supra note 8, at 1665. Five years after
creation of the Federal Circuit, Markey felt that most (but not all) of the barnacled encrustations
had been eliminated, and that the next major project for the Federal Circuit was to simplify patent
trials:
[T]he simplifying of patent trials is a duty of bench and bar that is today too often
unmet.
Over the years, two phenomena occurred: the patent law became
barnacled with sloganeered encrustations; and particular habits were developed
in conducting patent trials. Over the past five years, most of the encrustations
have been scraped from the law, but old trial habits remain. Return of the law to
its statutory moorings should now be accompanied by a return of the conduct of
patent trials to its own moorings in the statutes and rules.
Howard T. Markey, On SimplifyingPatent Trials, 116 F.R.D. 369, 369 (1987).
101 Johnston, supra note 100, at xix.
102 Markey, supranote 65, at 579.
103 Mark Abate & Edmund J. Fish, Supreme Court Review of the United States FederalCourt
ofAppeals for the FederalCircuit1982-1992, 2 FED. CIR. B.J. 307, 331 (1992).
104 475 U.S. 809 (1986).
105 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
106 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
107 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
108 Abate & Fish, supra note 103, at 331.
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review.10 9 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had infringed the plaintiffs
patents for plastic cable ties.110 The District Court concluded that the patents were
invalid because the improvements to the patents over the prior art would have been
obvious to one skilled in that art.111 The Federal Circuit reversed, disagreeing with
1 12
the District Court's assessment of the prior art, among other points.
Dennison filed a petition for writ of certiorari, arguing that the Federal Circuit
ignored the "clearly erroneous" standard of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a)
because the Federal Circuit substituted its view of the evidence for that of the
District Court.1 13 Rule 52(a) states that findings of fact shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and that due regard shall be given to the trial court's ability to
judge the credibility of the witnesses.1 14 Dennison claimed that the Federal Circuit
erred in substituting its view of factual issues for that of the District Court.
Specifically, Dennison pointed to the Federal Circuit's rejection of the District Court's
determination of what the prior art revealed, and the court's findings that the
differences identified between the plaintiffs patents and the prior art were
115
obvious.
The Supreme Court found Dennison's claims "not insubstantial,"'1 16 and granted
certiorari to consider the Federal Circuit's review of fact findings.1 17 Without any

109 475 U.S. 809 (1986).
110 Dennison, 475 U.S. at 809.
HI Id.at 810.
112 Id,
1:3 Id.
114 Id. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) states that
[I]n all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the
court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law
thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58; and in granting or
refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of
fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for
findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based
on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous,
and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the
credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the court
adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if
the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open
court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum
of decision filed by the court. Findings of fact and conclusions of law are
unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rule 12 or 56 or any other motion
except as provided in subdivision (c) of this rule.
FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
115Dennison, 475 U.S. at 810.
116Id. See infra note 122 (describing the Federal Circuit's subsequent attack on Dennison
because of the language in Dennison's Petition for Certiorari and Reply).
117Dennison, 475 U.S at 810. A commentator has argued that the Court felt compelled to
grant certiorari because of "excessive fact finding" on the part of the Federal Circuit. The Federal
Circuit justified that fact finding on the basis of alleged bad behavior on the part of the judge and
lawyers at the trial court. See Edward V. Filardi, The Federal CircuitHas Improperly Assumed the
Role of FactFinderand Has Departedfrom the StandardofAppellate Review UnderRule 52(a), The
Fourth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
112 F.R.D. 439, 609-11 (April 23, 1986).
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briefing on the merits, the Court vacated the Federal Circuit's judgment and
118
remanded the case for further consideration in light of Rule 52(a).
Although vacating and remanding, the Supreme Court only asked the Federal
Circuit to explain what appeared to be fact finding regarding the issue of
obviousness:
The Federal Circuit, however, did not mention Rule 52(a), did not explicitly
apply the clearly-erroneous standard to any of the District Court's findings
on obviousness, and did not explain why, if it was of that view, Rule 52(a)
had no applicability to this issue.
We therefore lack an adequate
explanation of the basis for the Court of Appeals' judgment: most
importantly, we lack the benefit of the FederalCircuit' informed opinion on
the complex issue of the degree to which the obviousness determination is
one of fact. 119
In its second opinion, 120 the Federal Circuit more explicitly explained its
reasoning and analysis. 121 The court even took time to launch an attack on Dennison
for what the Federal Circuit viewed as "egregious assertions" in Dennison's Petition
for Certiorari and Reply. 122 The Supreme Court appeared fully satisfied with the
Federal Circuit's second opinion, and denied certiorari in Dennison's subsequent
123
appeal.

118 Dennison, 475 U.S. at 811. Justice Marshall dissented from this "summary disposition" on
the grounds that the disposition was ordered "without affording the parties prior notice or an
opportunity to file briefs on the merits." Id.
119 Id. (emphasis added).
120 Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
121 Panduit Corp., 810 F.2d at 1565. In the beginning of its opinion on remand, the Federal
Circuit stated that
[t]he Background section of our earlier opinion noted error in the second set of
findings but did not label it clearly erroneous, Rule 52(a), and did not expressly
indicate that the noted error was not the basis for reversal set forth in the
Opinion section, thus raising a question respecting the basis for our judgment.
That circumstance, regrettable because it has delayed a just end to this litigation,
is here rectified.
Id.
122 Id. at 1582. In its opinion on remand, the Federal Circuit blasted Dennison for its "many
obfuscating assertions," and even included an Appendix outlining the court's most significant
grievances against Dennison. In the introductory paragraph of the Appendix, the court stated that
Dennison's Petition for Certiorari and Reply ignored our earlier opinion's
explication of legal error and need to consider all evidence, presented material for
the first time, and repeated misstatements of law Dennison employed in the trial
court but avoided before this court. This Appendix sets forth the more egregious
of the many obfuscating assertions in the Petition and Reply.
Id.
123 Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 481 U.S. 1052 (1987).
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2. Christianson
The first Supreme Court case to discuss Federal Circuit jurisdiction in patent
cases was Christianson v. Colt,124 which involved a jurisdictional battle between the
Federal Circuit and the Seventh Circuit. 125 The conflict began as an antitrust case in
District Court between Colt Industries Operating Corp, a leading manufacturer,
seller, and marketer of M-16 rifles and their parts and accessories, and Charles
Christianson, a former Colt employee who established his own M-16 parts business
after leaving Colt's employ. 12 6 After his business folded, Christianson sued Colt
under the Sherman Act, alleging that Colt's wrongful conduct, including their tactics
1 27
in previous litigation and issuance of warning letters to Christianson customers,
had driven Christianson out of business.1 28 Christianson's complaint included what
the Court termed an "obscure passage" 12 9 referencing Colt's patents:
The validity of the Colt patents had been assumed throughout the life of the
Colt patents through 1980. Unless such patents were invalid through the
wrongful retention of proprietary information in contravention of United
States Patent Law (35 U.S.C. § 112) in 1980, when such patents expired,
anyone 'who has ordinary skill in the rifle-making art' is able to use the
technology of such expired patents for which Colt earlier had a monopoly
position for 17 years . . . [Christianson] and anyone else has the right to
manufacture, contract for the manufacture, supply, market and sell the M130
16 and M-16 parts and accessories thereof at the present time.
Christianson then amended his complaint to add a second cause of action under
state law for tortious interference with his business relationship.1 3 1 Colt answered
the complaint by asserting that its conduct was necessary to protect the company's
trade secrets. 132
Colt also countersued on a variety of claims related to
133
Christianson's alleged misappropriation of M-16 specifications.
Christianson moved for summary judgment, finally raising "the patent-law issue
obliquely hinted at" in the original complaint. 134 On summary judgment, the plaintiff
486 U.S. 800 (1988).
Christianson,486 U.S. at 803.
126 Id.at 804-05.

124

125

127 Id. In 1983, Colt and Christianson were fellow defendants in a patent infringement lawsuit
involving two companies that had arranged a sale of M-16 rifles to El Salvador. When evidence
surfaced suggesting that Christianson had supplied the companies with certain M-16 specifications,
Colt sought a court order enjoining Christianson from further disclosures. The District Court
declined the motion, and Colt voluntarily dismissed its claims against Christianson. Id. at 805. Colt
continued to pursue the issue on its own by informing several current and potential Christianson
customers by letter that Christianson was illegally misappropriating Colt's trade secrets, and urging
the letter recipients to refrain from doing business with Christianson. Id.

128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at
133
134

805-06.
Id. at 806.
Id.
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argued that the defendant's patents were invalid through the wrongful retention of
proprietary information, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112.135 Since Colt benefited from
the protection of the invalid patents, argued Christianson, the trade secrets that the
patents should have disclosed lost any state law protection. 136 Christianson asked
the District Court to hold Colt's trade secrets invalid, and to hold that their claim of
137
invalidity be taken as established in all claims and counterclaims.
138
The District Court agreed with Christianson and granted summary judgment.
Colt appealed to the Federal Circuit. 139 In the first round of what the Supreme Court

later called a "perpetual game of jurisdictional ping-pong," 140 the Federal Circuit
concluded that it lacked jurisdiction and issued an unpublished order transferring
the appeal to the Seventh Circuit.14 1 The Seventh Circuit volleyed back by raising
the jurisdictional issue sua bponte, concluding that the Federal Circuit was "clearly
142
wrong" to send the case its way, and bouncing the case back to the Federal Circuit.
Chief Judge Markey, writing for the Federal Circuit, concluded that the Seventh
Circuit exhibited "a monumental misunderstanding of the patent jurisdiction granted
this court," 143 but proceeded to address the merits of the case in the "interests of
135 Id.
35 U.S.C. § 112 requires that patents disclose sufficient information to "enable any
person skilled in the art .. .to make and use the same" as well as a description of "the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention." Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000)).
The latter requirement was at issue in Christianson.
136 Christianson,486 U.S. at 806.
d.
1:38Id. The District Court invalidated nine of Colt's patents, declared all trade secrets relating

137

to the M-16 unenforceable, enjoined Colt from enforcing "any form of trade secret right in any
technical information relating to the M16 [sic]," and ordered Colt to disgorge all such information to
Christianson. Id. at 806 (citing Christianson v. Colt, 613 F. Supp. 330, 332 (C.D. Ill. 1985)).
139 Christianson,486 U.S. at 806.
140 Id. at 818.
III Id. In its second hearing of the case, the Federal Circuit explained what had occurred in its
first hearing, stating that "[o]n December 4, 1985, this court granted Christianson's motion in a
short unpublished order that did not explain why jurisdiction was lacking, it being expected that the
parties and others interested would recognize that it was based on the reasons and authorities set
forth in [Christianson's] brief." Christianson v. Colt, 822 F.2d 1544, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
142 Christianson, 486 U.S. at 806. The Seventh Circuit held that "because Christianson's right
to recovery, although ostensibly based on the antitrust laws, 'would be defeated by one or sustained
by an opposite construction' of the patent laws," the action did arise under the patent laws and
therefore belonged in the Federal Circuit. Christianson v. Colt, 798 F.2d 1051, 1061 (quoting
Beghin-Say Int'l Inc. v. Ole-Bendt Rasmussen, 733 F.2d 1568, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
143 Christianson,486 U.S. at 807 (citing Christianson,822 F.2d at 1547). Markey began his
opinion with this introductory statement:
The present appeal reflects a monumental misunderstanding of the patent
jurisdiction granted this court. An appeal in a pure and simple antitrust case is
here solely because an issue of patent law appears in an argument against a
defense. Christianson asserted rights that arise under, and only under, antitrust
law. Colt's defense is its trade-secret rights under state law. Christianson's
argument against that defense is that Colt lost its secrets because it did not
disclose them in its patent applications. The district court's opinion said Colt's
patents were invalid. Colt requested inclusion of that view in the final judgment
and brought its appeal here.
Christianson,822 F.2d at 1547. Markey went on to explain that the Federal Circuit had been
granted "case" and not "issue" jurisdiction:
Congress spelfcal]y and expressly rejected proposals that this court have "issue"
jurisdiction and that appeals involving patent and nonpatent issues be bifurcated.
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The Federal Circuit reversed the District Court, 145 and the Supreme

Court finally stopped the dizzying game by granting certiorari.146
The jurisdictional issue in the case was whether Christianson was a case
"arising under" a federal patent statute. 147 The Court's analysis began with 28
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), which grants the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over "an
appeal from a final decision of a district court of the United States . . . if the

jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on [28 U.S.C. §J 1338."148
Section 1338 states that the district courts shall have original jurisdiction over any
civil action arising under patent laws. 149 The same "arising under" language appears
in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides a general grant of federal question jurisdiction to
the district courts. 150 Because of the same "arising under" language in both statutes,
and the similar policies served by the two grants of jurisdiction, the Court
interpreted the scope of § 1338 jurisdiction the same way as the scope of § 1331
jurisdiction had been interpreted. 151 Therefore, the correct test for determining
whether an action's jurisdiction arises under § 1338 is the same two-part test used to
determine § 1331 jurisdiction: (1) does it appear in the well-pleaded complaint that
152
(2) the case arises under federal law.

The Court stated that "[liinguistic consistency" required it to extend § 1338
jurisdiction only to those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either
that federal patent law creates the cause of action, or that the plaintiffs right to
relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent
Rather, Congress granted this court jurisdiction over all appeals in "§ 1338 cases."
Accordingly, this court decides all issues, including nonpatent issues, in a "case"
that is properly within its jurisdiction. Having granted this court "case" and not
"issue" jurisdiction, Congress clearly left cases merely involving defenses that
raise patent issues in the regional courts of appeals, because the district court's
jurisdiction in those cases is based solely on diversity, or on other grounds, and
not "in whole or in part on section 1338."
Id.at 1553 (citations omitted).
144 Christianson,486 U.S. at 807 (citing Christianson,822 F.2d at 1559-60).
H5

Id.

146

Christianson v. Colt, 484 U.S. 985 (1987).
Christianson,486 U.S. at 807.
Id.(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2000)).

147
11

149 Id.
150 Id. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). The Court had used
similar language in 1897 when interpreting § 1338's precursor. In Prattv. Paris Gas Light & Coke
Co., the Court held that in order to demonstrate that a case arose under federal patent law, "the
plaintiff must set up some right, title or interest under the patent laws, or at least make it appear
that some right or privilege will be defeated by one construction, or sustained by the opposite
construction of these laws." 168 U.S. 255, 259 (1897).
151Christianson,486 U.S. at 809.
152 Id. The Court determined that under the well-pleaded complaint rule, as adapted to §
1338(a), whether a claim "arises under" patent law "must be determined from what necessarily
appears in the plaintiffs statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything
alleged in anticipation or avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose."
Id. (citing Franchise Tax Board of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10
(1983) (quoting Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1914))). The Court stated that a case raising
a federal patent-law defense does not "arise under" patent law, "even if the defense is anticipated in
the plaintiffs complaint, and even if both parties admit that the defense is the only question truly at
issue in the case." Id.(citing Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 1 at 10).
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law, i.e., that patent law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded claims. 153
The Court's review of the complaint showed that patent law did not "in any sense"
create the plaintiffs antitrust or intentional interference claims. 154 The dispute
therefore centered on whether patent law was a necessary element of one of the well155
pleaded antitrust claims.
156
Colt had raised three arguments justifying jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit.
First, Colt raised the uniformity issue, arguing that one of Congress's objectives in
creating a Federal Circuit with exclusive jurisdiction over certain patent cases was to
reduce non-uniformity and uncertainty in patent law. 157 Colt argued that those goals
would be better served if the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction was fixed by reference to
the case actually litigated rather than the elements of the complaint. 158 The Court
agreed that Colt's conclusion may be true, but that Congress only chose to grant the
Federal Circuit jurisdiction over an appeal from a district court if the jurisdiction of
the district court was based on § 1338.159
When creating the Federal Circuit,
Congress decided that the jurisdictions of both the district courts and the Federal
Circuit would be determined by reference to the well-pleaded complaint rule rather
than a well-tried case rule. 160 The Court declined to overrule that clear congressional
1 61
intent.
Colt next argued that the Court should deem the complaint amended to
encompass a new and independent cause of action under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(b), which allows issues to be treated as if they arose in the pleadings if
they are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties. 162 The Court
disagreed, finding no evidence of any consent among the two parties to litigate the
new patent law claims, and stating that "the patent-law focus of the summary
163
judgment papers hardly heralded the assertion of a new patent-law claim."
Colt's final argument was that the Federal Circuit was obliged not to revisit the
Seventh Circuit's thorough analysis of the jurisdictional issue, but merely to adopt it
as the law of the case. 164 The "law of the case" doctrine states that "when a court
decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in
153

Id.

4d,
Id. (stating that the "[e]xamination of the complaint reveals that the monopolization theory
that Colt singles out (and on which [Christianson] ultimately prevailed in the District Court) is only
one of several, and the only one for which the patent-law issue is even arguably essential").
156 Id.at 813.
157 Id.
154

155

158 Id.

159

Id.

160Id.at 814 (citing H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 41).
161 Id.
162 Id. The rule states that
[w]hen issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent
of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them
to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of
any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to so amend does not
affect the result of the trial of these issues.
FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b).
163 Christianson, 486 U.S. at 815.
104

Id.
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subsequent stages in the same case." 165 The Court agreed that the doctrine applied
as much to the decisions of a coordinate court in the same case as to a court's own
decisions. 166 The Court disagreed, however, that jurisdiction lay in the Federal
Circuit. 167 First, the Federal Circuit, in transferring the case to the Seventh Circuit,
was the first to decide the jurisdictional issue. 168 It was the Seventh Circuit and not
the Federal Circuit who had departed from the law of the case. 169 Second, the "law of
the case" doctrine allows courts to revisit prior decisions of its own or of a coordinate
170
Most
court, although courts should only do so in extraordinary circumstances.
importantly for the Supreme Court, the doctrine does not bind the Court in reviewing
decisions from lower courts. 171 According to the Court, a petition for writ of certiorari
17 2
could expose the entire case to review.
The Court concluded by holding that the appeal in this case belonged in the
Seventh Circuit rather than the Federal Circuit. 173 The complaint did not invoke §
1338 jurisdiction, as § 1295(a)(1) requires, and therefore did not arise under the
17 4
patent laws.
The Court was not pleased that the Federal Circuit chose to decide the case even
though that court felt it did not have jurisdiction. Stating that it "disapprove[d] of
[the Federal Circuit's] decision to reach the merits anyway 'in the interest of
justice,"' 17 5 the Court emphasized that courts created by statute have no jurisdiction
except that conferred by the statute. 176 Once deciding that it did not have
jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit should have either dismissed the case, or transferred
1 77
it to the court of appeals that did have jurisdiction.
The Court acknowledged that injustice sometimes occurs when courts adhere to
178
the rule that a court may not in any case extend its jurisdiction where none exists.
Such injustice may include parties wasting years to litigate claims, only to learn later
that their efforts and expense were wasted in a court that lacked jurisdiction.17 9 The
facts of Christiansonillustrate another example of injustice, where the "litigants are
bandied back and forth helplessly between two courts, each of which insists the other
has jurisdiction."180 The Court suggested that the courts of appeal could encourage
quicker settlement of questions of transfer by adhering strictly to the principles of
law of the case.18 1 Under the law of the case doctrine, if the transferee court can find
165 Id. (citing 822 F.2d at 1565 (Nichols, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Arizona v.
California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983) (dictum))).
166 Id. at 816.
167 Id. at 817.
16;8 _d.

169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.

172 Id.
173 Id. at 819.
174 Id. at 814.
15 Id. at 818 (citing Christianson,822 F.2d at 1559).
170 Id. (citing Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 441, 449 (1850)).
177

Id.

178 Id.
179

Id.

180 Id.

181 Id. at 819.
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the transfer decision plausible, its jurisdictional inquiry is at an end.18 2 The Court
stated that adherence to the law of the case doctrine could prevent the Court from
having to resolve every "marginal jurisdictional dispute" between the courts of
18 3
appeal, such as it had done in this case.
18 4
Justice Stevens concurred in the opinion, joined by Justice Blackmun.
Stevens wrote separately to emphasize that the answer to the question of whether a
18 5
If
claim arises under the patent laws may depend on when the question is asked.
the question is asked at the end of a trial in order to decide whether the Federal
Circuit has appellate jurisdiction, the answer could be different than if it had been
asked at the onset.186
Christianson allowed the Court to resolve some of the jurisdictional questions
that had been raised by the new Federal Circuit's grant of jurisdiction over patent
cases. The Court set out the clear rule that jurisdiction under § 1338 would follow
187
the established jurisdictional test of § 1331 and the well-pleaded complaint rule.
Despite this clear rule, the Federal Circuit did not read the Court's decision in
Christiansonas requiring strict compliance with the well-pleaded complaint rule. In
a Federal Circuit case decided two years after Christianson, Chief Judge Markey
firmly stated that "[it is apparent from their unanimous opinion that the Justices
did not intend to make a rigid application of the well-pleaded complaint rule a
Procrustean bed188 for this court's jurisdiction." 18 9 Instead, the Federal Circuit urged
a balance between the well-pleaded complaint rule and the stated congressional goals
of uniform patent law jurisprudence and reduced forum shopping.1 90 This balance
was temporarily achieved, until the Court's 2002 decision in Holmes Group v.
Vornado upset the jurisdictional apple cart.19 1

3. Bonito Boats, Inc.
Bonito Boats Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.192 has been described by one
commentator as the Supreme Court's attempt to remind the legal community that
the Court still remained involved in patent law jurisprudence. 193 In Bonito Boats,
the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had violated a Florida statute when it used a
direct molding process to duplicate Bonito's fiberglass hull, and then knowingly sold

182 Id. (citing Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100, 109, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 828 (1982) ("The law
of the case will be disregarded only when the court has a 'clear conviction of error').
s:3Id.
184 Id. at 820.
185

Id.

Id.
187 Id. at 80809.
188 "Procrustean bed" is a scheme or pattern into which someone or something is arbitrarily
forced. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (9th ed. 1983).
189 Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Mach. Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle, Ltd., 895 F.2d 736, 741 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
186

190 Id. at 74445.
191 See generallyinfra Part V (discussing the Court's opinion in Holmes Group v. Vornado).
192

489 U.S. 141 (1989).

193

Desmond, supra note 26, at 455 n.73.
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duplicates of the hull. 194 The Florida statute made it unlawful for any person to use
the direct molding process to duplicate for the purpose of sale any manufactured
vessel hull or vessel component part made by another. 195 The statute also forbid a
person to knowingly sell a vessel hull or vessel component part. 196 The plaintiff was
forced to file suit under the state statute because he had not filed for patent
197
protection with the Patent and Trademark Office.
The District Court granted Thunder Craft's motion to dismiss, on the grounds
that the Florida statute conflicted with federal patent law, and was therefore invalid
under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.1 98 A divided appellate court
1 99
affirmed the dismissal.
The Florida Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts, reading the Supreme
Court's opinions in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 200 and Compco Corp. v. DayBrite Lighting, Inc. 20 1 for the proposition that "when an article is introduced into the
public domain, only a patent can eliminate the inherent risk of competition and then
but for a limited time." 20 2 Three dissenting Florida Supreme Court judges relied on
the Federal Circuit's decision in Interpart Corp. v. Italia2 3 to argue that the Florida
statute did not prohibit the copying of an unpatented item. 20 4 These judges reasoned
that the statute merely prohibited one method of copying, and that the item
remained in the public domain. 20 5 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve the conflict between the Federal Circuit and the Florida Supreme Court over
what limits the federal patent system places on the States' ability to offer substantial
protection to utilitarian and design ideas that the patent laws leave otherwise
206
unprotected.
The Court began its opinion with a lengthy review of patent history, policy and
theory. After discussing legal precedent from the common law of England, 20 7 the first
Patent Act, 208 and the writings of Thomas Jefferson, 20 9 the Court finally turned to its
previous holdings in Sears and Compeo. The Court acknowledged that the holdings in
those cases were controversial, and had been the subject of "heated scholarly and
judicial debate." 210 The Court felt that a common, but erroneous, reading of those
holdings saw no maneuvering room for the States to offer any form of protection to
2 11
articles or processes falling within the broad scope of patentable subject matter.
191Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 145.
195 Id. at 144 (citing FLA. STAT. § 559.94(2)).
196 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 145 (citing FLA. STAT. § 559.94(3)).
197
198

Id. at 144.
Id. at 145.

199 -d.

376 U.S. 225 (1964).
376 U.S. 234 (1964).
202 Bonita Boats, 489 U.S. at 145 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 515
So. 2d 220, 222 (Fla. 1987)).
203 777 F.2d 678 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
204 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146.
200
201

205

Id.

Id. at
Id. at
208 Id. at
209 Id. at
210 Id. at
211 Id.
206
207

144.
149.
146.
147.
154.

[2:201 2003]

John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

The Court felt that some parties had jumped to the conclusion that the States had no
power whatsoever to regulate patentable subject matter, 212 because "patentable
subject matter" could be construed to include "anything under the sun that is made
by man."213 The Court pooh-poohed this interpretation of its holdings, and stated
that the States had plenty of maneuvering room in which to offer protection. 214 For
example, States could regulate potentially patentable but unpatented subject matter
through state trademark and trade dress laws. 215 The Court concluded by holding
that the Florida statute was preempted by the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution because the statute represented a break with the tradition of peaceful
2 16
co-existence between state market regulation and federal patent policy.
The Court did not agree with the Federal Circuit's opinion in Interpart.That
opinion had been cited by the plaintiff, supporting amici,217 and the three dissenting
judges on the Florida Supreme Court. 218 In Interpart,the Federal Circuit had upheld
a California law that prohibited the duplication of unpatented car mirrors.2 19 The
Federal Circuit stated that the California statute prevented unscrupulous
competitors from using an original product as a pattern for subsequent copies. 220 The
Court found the Federal Circuit's reasoning defective, stating that the court
"apparently viewed the direct molding statute at issue in Interpart as a mere
regulation of the use of chattels." 221 The Court was also "somewhat troubled" by the
Federal Circuit's reference to an older case 222 for the proposition that the patent laws
say nothing about the right to copy or the right to use. The Court found this
reasoning "puzzling" because it "flies in the face of the same court's decisions
223
applying the teaching of Sears and Compeo in other contexts."
Although the Court found reason to be "troubled" and "puzzled" by the Federal
Circuit's decision in Interpart,it was troubled and puzzled by policy issues rather
than substantive patent law issues. The questions posed in Bonito Boats involved
212 Id.
213
214
215

Id. (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).
Id.
d.

Id.
217 IN.
218 Id.
219 Id.
216

at 167-68.

at 163.
at 146.
at 163.

220 Id.
221 Id. The Supreme Court's reasoning itself has been criticized for failing to give weight to the
Federal Circuit's opinion in Interpart. "The issue, after all, was what federal patent policies
requires be [sic] in the public domain and one might have thought that a court with expertise in
patent policy would have been perceived as especially qualified to deliver an answer." Rochelle
Dreyfuss, The FederalCircuit:A Model for the Future?The Tenth Annual Judicial Conference of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 146 F.R.D. 205 (April 30, 1993).
222 Mine Safety Applicances Co. v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 56 C.C.P.A. 863, 864 n.2
(1969).
223 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 165. The Court's examples of previous Federal Circuit decisions

applying Sears and Compeo included Power Controls Corp. v. H-ybrinetics, Inc., 806 F.2d 234, 240
(Fed. Cir. 1986), which stated that '[i]t is well established... that an action for unfair competition
cannot be based upon a functional design." Id. The other example cited by the Court was Gemveto
Jewelry Co. v. Jeff Cooper Inc., 800 F.2d 256, 259 (Fed. Cir. 1986) which vacated an injunction
against the copying of jewelry designs issued under state law of unfair competition "in view of the
Sea-rs and Compeo decisions which hold that copying of the article itself that is unprotected by the
federal patent and copyright laws cannot be protected by state law." Id.
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the proper scope of the federal government's patent system, and what limits the
federal system could place on the ability of a state to offer protection to utilitarian
and design ideas. Bonito Boats does not show the Court granting deference to the
Federal Circuit, but it also does not show the Court engaging in substantive patent
law decision-making.

4. Eli Lilly & Co.
The only substantive patent law case reviewed by the Supreme Court during the
first ten years of the Federal Circuit's existence was Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronie,
Inc. 224 Eli Lilly filed suit against Medtronic to enjoin Medtronic's testing and
marketing of an implantable cardiac defibrillator, a medical device used in the
treatment of heart patients, claiming that Medtronic's device infringed Eli Lilly's
patents. 225 Medtronic argued that its activities were exempt from a finding of
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) because the activities were reasonably
related to the development and submission of information under the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).226

The District Court rejected Medtronic's argument, concluding that the
exemption only applied to drug products, and did not apply to the development and
submission of information relating to medical devices. 227 As such, Medtronic could
not assert the statute as a defense against Lilly's charges of infringement. 228 The
jury returned a verdict for Eli Lilly on the first patent, and the court directed a
verdict for Eli Lilly on the second patent. 229 The District Court entered judgment for
230
Eli Lilly and issued a permanent injunction against Medtronic.
The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that § 271(e)(1) allows a party to make,
use, or sell any type of patented invention if it was solely done for the restricted uses
stated in the statute. 231 The court stated that Medtronic's activities could not
22 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
225 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 1987 WL 26676, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 1987).
226

IN. 35 U.S.C § 271(e)(1) states that:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the
United States or import into the United States a patented invention (other than a

new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) which is
primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma
technology, or other processes involving site specific genetic manipulation
techniques) solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission
of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale
of drugs or veterinary biological products.
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
227 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 402, 403 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
22 Id

496 U.S. at 664.
Id.
Eli Lilly, 872 F.2d at 406. The Federal Circuit stated that the statutory changes had been
drafted by Congress to overrule the Federal Circuit's earlier opinion in Roche Products,Inc. v. Bolar
Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir.), cart. denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984). In Roche, the
Federal Circuit had declined to extend or create an experimental use exception for FDA testing. The
229 Eli Lilly,

230
231

court noted that Congress was the appropriate forum to resolve the matter, and that legislation on
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constitute infringement if they had been undertaken to develop information
reasonably related to the development and submission of information necessary to
obtain regulation approval under the FDCA.2 32 The Federal Circuit remanded for the
District Court to determine whether this condition had been met.2 3 3 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine whether activities that would otherwise
constitute patent infringement would be non-infringing if they are undertaken for
the purpose of developing and submitting to the Food and Drug Administration
234
(FDA) to obtain marketing approval for a medical device.
The issue was one of statutory interpretation. Eli Lilly interpreted the statutory
phrase "a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs," to
refer only to individual provisions of federal law that regulate drugs. 235 Medtronic
interpreted the statute to refer to "the entirety of any Act (including, of course, the
FDCA) at least some of whose provisions regulate drugs."23 6 After a fairly extensive
review of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 and
various FDCA statutes, the Court concluded, in a 6-2 decision, that Medtronic's (and
thus the Federal Circuit's) interpretation of the statute was correct.2 3 7 In what one
commentator has termed a "curmudgeonly flourish," 238 Justice Scalia concluded the
majority opinion by declaring that
[n]o interpretation we have been able to imagine can transform § 271(e)(1)
into an elegant piece of statutory draftsmanship. To construe it as the
[Federal Circuit] decided, one must posit a good deal of legislative
imprecision; but to construe it as [Eli Lilly] would, one must posit that and
239
an implausible substantive intent as well.
related topics was pending in Congress. Eli Lilly, 872 F.2d at 404. Five years later, in Eli Lilly, the
Federal Circuit stated that it "is clear to this court, as well as to the parties and the district court...
that section 271(e)(1) was added to overrule this court's decision in Roche." Id. at 406. The
statutory changes were contained in § 202 of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984. Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 665.
2:32Eli Lilly, 872 F.2d at 406.
233 Id. at 407.
234 Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 663.
2:35Id. at 665.
236

Id.

237

Id.

2:38Mark D. Janis,

PatentLaw in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV.

387, 416 (2001).
239 El Lilly, 496 U.S. at 679. Judge Nies, writing for the Federal Circuit, agreed that it was
difficult to interpret the meaning of § 271(e)(1):
Each of the parties has urged that the above-quoted statutory language of 35
U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) is "clear." However, each has put forth equally plausible
interpretations of section 271(e)(1), which to us means the language is fraught
with ambiguity. The district court and Lilly limit the exception for "patented
inventions" to patented drugs by reading the last clause of 271(e)(1) as a
restriction on that otherwise broad statutory language. Medtronic urges that the
exception extends to all types of "patented inventions" provided the use being
made is for testing to obtain approval from FDA for sale of a product after the
relevant patent has expired. Per Medtronic, the last clause describes the type of
law, not the type of patented invention. Furthermore, as is often the case, each
side has been able to highlight general statements in the legislative history which
allegedly support their own reading of section 271(e)(1).
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This case found the Supreme Court agreeing with the Federal Circuit on a
statutory interpretation issue. Although both courts deplored the language of the
statute, they each eventually came to the same conclusion about the meaning of that
language. As the only example of Supreme Court review of a substantive patent law
decision during this time period, this case proved to be a relatively painless
experience for the Federal Circuit. The Supreme Court's attitude toward the Federal
Circuit and its decision-making abilities, however, was gradually beginning to
change.

IV. THE HONEYMOON IS OVER: THE SUPREME COURT'S DECREASING
DEFERENCE TO THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

A. Changes in the FederalCircuit
The original Federal Circuit began with what has been termed the finest staff
and the most distinguished judges, armed with demonstrated expertise in patent law
issues. 240 The Federal Circuit's patent expertise has, perhaps naturally, become
diluted due to subsequent appointments. The backgrounds of today's Federal Circuit
judges are generally more diverse than the backgrounds of the original judges.

241

With the absorption of the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals into
the Federal Circuit, the former court is no longer available to provide "on the job"
training to judges inexperienced in patent law. 242 A pre-judicial career as a patent
law practitioner would obviously result in expertise in that area of the law, but only
three judges out of the currently sitting eleven active judges and six senior judges
243
practiced patent law before their appointments to the Federal Circuit.

Despite the fact that the Federal Circuit is not a "specialized court," its
jurisdictional statutes dictate that its docket is limited to only certain areas of the
law. As was predicted in the legislative history to the Federal Courts Improvement
Act of 1982, patent law issues make up a major portion of the court's docket. 244 In
fact, a recent statistical sampling from an intellectual property bar association
determined that the Federal Circuit spends over 50% of its time in the area of patent

EliLi]ly, 872 F.2d at 405.
240 MARKEY, supranote 8, at 1719.
241 See generally U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Judicial Biographies at
http://www.fedcir.gov/judgbios.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2002). For biographical information on the
original Federal Circuit judges, see generally The Judges and Their Staffs, The United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, A History 17-97 (1991).
242 Markey, supra note 69, at 1.
243 Report Concerning the Nomination of Judges to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
8, American Intellectual Property Law Association (March 2001) [hereinafter AIPLA Nomination
Report].
244 See S. REP. No. 97-275, at 4-5.
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law. 245 Thus, although the patent background of Federal Circuit judges has declined,
the time those judges spend on patent cases has not.
Another difference between 1982's Federal Circuit and that court in 2003 is the
absence of former Chief Judge Markey. As "the poster boy for testosterone,"246
Markey had the self-confidence necessary to lead the Federal Circuit's vigorous
charge into the patent arena. The Federal Circuit lost an important asset upon
Markey's retirement from the bench in 1991.247 Under Chief Judge Markey's strong
leadership, the Federal Circuit could arguably get away with being the de facto
Supreme Court for patent cases. Without Markey, that possibility looked less likely.
As the Federal Circuit became more established, it began to find itself under
attack for its decisions and its decision-making processes. As noted above, the brand
new Federal Circuit felt no compunction about ignoring or overruling Supreme Court
precedent. 248 By 1993, the Federal Circuit was also being accused of inordinately
overturning district court decisions that were consistent with Supreme Court rulings,
and of imposing its own policies within areas normally governed by the Supreme
Court or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 249 As a result, the district courts
showed a tendency to follow the Federal Circuit's interpretation of the law, rather
than the law as expounded by the Supreme Court. 250 This was a pragmatic decision
by the district courts: by siding with the Federal Circuit over the Supreme Court, the
district courts were less likely to have their decisions overturned on appeal.
The Federal Circuit has also been accused of engaging in excessive fact finding.
Less than four years after the court's creation, a commentator was already warning
of the harm the Federal Circuit was fostering through its practice of excessive fact
finding. 251 It has been suggested that this practice of excessive fact finding may have
252
prompted the Court's grant of certiorari in Dennison v. Panduit,
and also promoted
an expectation among the district courts that the Federal Circuit would review cases
de novo. 253 Charges of excessive fact-finding by the Federal Circuit have continued,

245 AIPLA Nomination Report, supra note 243, at 3. Appeals from the Merit Systems
Protection Board are the most numerous types of cases, but require less judicial time than patent
cases. Id.
246 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
217Chief Judge Markey retired from the bench on April 30, 1991. The Judges and Their Staffs,

supra note 77, at 19.
248 See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
219 Desmond, supra note 26, at 486. For example, in Graham v. John Deere, the Supreme
Court developed a three-part test for use in determining "obviousness." 383 U.S. at 17. The Federal
Circuit rewrote the Supreme Court's test by changing the weight given to "secondary considerations"
or objective indicia in the analysis. Desmond, supra note 26, at 476.
250 Desmond, supra note 26, at 484.
251 Edward V. Filardi, The Federal CircuitHas Improperly Assumed the Role of Fact Finder
and Has Departedfrom the Standardof Appellate Review Under Rule 52(a), The Fourth Annual
Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 112 F.R.D. 439,
610 (April 23, 1986).
252 Id. at 611 (terming the Federal Circuit's fact finding behavior in Dennison as the "straw
that broke the camel's back," thus prompting the Court's grant of certiorari). See infra Part III.D. 1
for a discussion of Dennison.
2'3 Filardi, supra note 251, at 611.
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and exemplify the growing rumblings of discontent from the patent law
community toward the Federal Circuit.
254

B. DecreasedDeference by the Supreme Court to the FederalCircuitin Patent Cases
The Supreme Court has recently become less deferential to the Federal Circuit
in patent law issues. Although the Supreme Court in Markman (1996) made a point
of emphasizing the important role the Federal Circuit plays in improving patent law
uniformity and strengthening the U.S. patent system, the Court's general deference
toward the lower court has gradually been changing. The Court is taking on a
greater role in substantive patent cases, as demonstrated by its recent opinions in
Warner-Jenkinson (1997), Pfaff (1998), and Festo (2002). Additionally, with its
decision in Holmes Group v. Vornado (2002), the Court effectively re-opened the door
to regional circuit (and even state court) influence in patent law jurisprudence. An
examination of these recent decisions illustrates the Court's changing attitude
toward the Federal Circuit.

1. Markman
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.255 is recognized as an influential case

for patent law practitioners because of its holding that claim construction is a matter
of law exclusively for the court, 256 thus prompting the evolution of what have become
2 57
known as "Markman hearings" to accommodate claim construction determinations.
Markman involved a dispute over an inventory control device used by laundries
and dry cleaners.2 58 The patent in question covered a device capable of monitoring
and reporting the location of "inventory" in laundry and dry cleaning
establishments,2 59 thus helping to solve related problems prevalent in the drycleaning business, such as lost articles or employee embezzlement.2 60 Markman
alleged that Westview's competing inventory control system 261 infringed three claims
254

See William C. Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil, JudicialHyperactivity: The FederalCircuits

Discomfort with its Appellate Role, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725, 739-48 (2000).
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
Id. at 372.
John R. Lane & Christine A. Pepe, Living Before, Through, and with Markman: Claim
Construction as a Matter of Law, 1 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 59, 63 (Summer 2001). Markman
hearings are court proceedings independent of the trial itself. Lane and Pepe note that some courts
have resisted conducting separate Markman hearings, chosing instead to interpret claim language
through "conventional motion practice." Id. (citing Mediacom Corp. v. Rates Technology, Inc., 4 F.
Supp. 2d 17, 22 (D.Mass. 1998)).
258 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1535, 1536 (E.D.Pa. 1991).
259 Markman, 772 F. Supp. at 1537.
260Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 971 (Fed. Cir. 1995). As described in
the patent, the absence of effective inventory control could result in the loss of clothing during the
sorting or cleaning processes. Id. Inadequate inventory controls would also create opportunities for
shop employees to send clothes for cleaning, but then pocket all customer payments themselves, a
scheme that could be difficult for shop owners to detect and deter. Id
255
256
257

261

Markman, 772 F. Supp. at 1536-37. The defendant's system was comprised of two pieces of

equipment, the DATAMARK and the DATASCAN:
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in Markman's patent. 262 The jury partially agreed with the plaintiff, finding that
Westview infringed claims 1 and 10, but not claim 14.263 Westview then filed a
motion for a directed verdict, arguing that the language of the patent and evidence
presented at trial required an interpretation by the court of the patent claims at
issue. 264

The defendants 265 also argued that the undisputed facts concerning the

The DATAMARK is a stationary unit comprising a keyboard, electronic display,
processor, and printer. When a customer brings articles of clothing in for
cleaning, an attendant enters on a keypad information about the customer,
articles to be cleaned, and charges for cleaning. The DATAMARK then prints a
bar-coded ticket or invoice listing the information about the customer, the clothes
to be cleaned, and the charges for the cleaning. The DATAMARK retains
permanently in memory only the invoice number, date, and cash total. The
DATAMARK is thus used to print bar-coded tickets for the articles and to retain
an invoice list.
The DATASCAN is a portable unit comprising a microprocessor and an optical
detector for reading bar-coded tickets or invoices at any location in the drycleaning establishment.
To use the DATASCAN, first the invoice list is
transferred from the DATAMARK to the DATASCAN. Then, the DATASCAN is
carried about to read the bar-codes on tickets or invoices in the establishment. As
it does this, it can report any discrepancy between the particular invoice read (or
not read) and the invoice list. In this way, the DATASCAN identifies extra or
missing invoices.
Markman, 52 F.3d at 973.
2(2 Marikman, 772 F. Supp. at 1536-37. Markman initially alleged that three claims, 1, 10, and
14, were infringed. Id. The issue eventually involved just the first two claims, as the district court
determined that a jury verdict in favor of the defendants controlled as to claim 14, and Markman did
not contest that determination. Id. at 1536. Claim 1 covered an actual data input device, a data
processor, dot matrix printer, and at least one optical scanner, and was described by the trial court
as:
The inventory control and reporting system, comprising: a data input device for
manual operation by an attendant, the input device having switch means operable
to encode information relating to sequential transactions, each of the transactions
having articles associated therewith, said information including transaction
identity and descriptions of each of said articles associated with the transaction;
[A] data processor including memory operable to record said information and
means to maintain an inventory total, said data processor having means to
associate sequential transactions with unique sequential indicia and to generate
at least one report of said total and said transactions, the unique sequential
indicia and the descriptions of articles in the sequential transactions being
reconcilable against one another;
[A] dot matrix printer operable under control of the data processor to generate a
written record of the indicia associated with sequential transactions, the written
record including optically-detectable bar codes bring printed only in coincidence
with each said transaction and at least part of the written record bearing a
portion to be attached to said articles; and
[A]t least one optical scanner connected to the data processor and operable to
detect said bar codes on all articles passing a predetermined station, whereby said
system can detect and localize spurious additions to inventory as well as spurious
deletions therefrom.
Id. Claim 10 covered an input device, described by the trial court as "the system of claim 1,
wherein the input device is a keyboard having alpha-numeric keys, and also having keys specific to
a plurality of common attributes of the articles and common optional attributes of the sequential
transactions, said common attributes being recorded using single key strokes." Id.
2 3 Markman, 52 F.3d at 973.
264 Markman, 772 F. Supp. at 1536.
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capabilities of its product coupled with the correct reading of the patent claims
266
required a verdict in Westview's favor.
The court framed the issue as a question of claim construction, and found that
the question was a matter of law for the court. 267 The construction in question
revolved around the meaning of the terms used to sustain Markman's claims of
infringement. 268 The expert testimony offered by the plaintiff had, in the court's
opinion, "attempted to redefine several common words in unusual ways," 269 including
the word "inventory,"
which the expert defined as "cash" or "invoices" rather than
"articles of clothing."270 The district court disagreed with this attempted redefinition,
stating that the expert's interpretations were contrary to the ordinary and customary
meaning of the terms. 271 The court also found the interpretations contrary to the
obvious meaning intended by the patentee, as determined from the patent
specifications, drawings, and file histories. 272 Since Westview's device did not include
every element of Markman's claim, and did not perform the same function as the
273
claimed invention, the court found no literal or equivalent infringement.
Markman appealed the district court's holding on counts 1 and 10, arguing that
the district court erred in granting the judgment as a matter of law. 274 The
defendants, on the other hand, argued that the patent and prosecution history were
in conflict with the testimony, and that Markman's evidence should be disregarded in

2 5 Ma±rkman, 52 F.3d at 972. The defendants included Westview Instruments, Inc., which
made and sold the allegedly infringing device, and Althon Enterprises, Inc., which owned and
operated two dry-cleaning sites, and allegedly used Westview's devices in one of its shops. Id.
266 Markman, 772 F. Supp. at 1536.
267 Id., (citing Kraus v. Bell Atl. Corp., 716 F. Supp. 182, 184 (E.D. Pa. 1989)).

2 8 Id.
269 Id.
270 Id.
The plaintiffs expert had also testified that "report" meant "invoice," and "attached to

said articles" meant "attached to a plastic bag that covers a batch of the articles." Id.
271 Id.
272 Id. The court stated that in interpreting the meaning of patent claims, "w]ords in a claim
'will be given their ordinary and accustomed meaning unless it appears that the inventor used them
differently."'
id. at 1537, (citing Jonsson v. Stanley Works, 903 F.2d 812, 820 (Fed. Cir. 1990))
(quoting Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc., 730 F.2d 753, 759 (Fed. Cir. 1984); (quoting Universal
Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Refining Co., 137 F.2d 3, 6 (7th Cir. 1943), affd, 322 U.S. 471 (1944))).
273 Id. at 1537-38.
The court determined that Markman's patent covered a sophisticated
system that used computer memory and was capable of monitoring and reporting the location of
articles of clothing, i.e., "inventory," in a dry cleaning or laundry. The defendants' device had no
such capability, and was more comparable to a "rudimentary invoice printer." Id. The defendants'
device did not include an optical scanner, and was unable to detect bar codes on all articles of
clothing that passed through a predetermined station. Id. The device also lacked the dual capacity
to detect and localize spurious additions or deletions to both the cash inventory and the actual
physical inventory of articles of clothing. Id. The court also discounted the effect of any exaggerated
claims by the defendants in their sales or instructional literature about their systems' capabilities,
stating that "spurious advertising claims for defendants' products do not a patent infringement
make." Id. (citing Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Siliconix, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 77, 79 (N.D. Cal. 1989);
Welding Eng'rs. v. Aetna-Standard Eng'g. Co., 169 F. Supp. 146, 149 (W.D. Pa. 1958)).
274 Markman, 52 F.3d at 973-74. Markman contended that the jury was properly given the
question of claim construction, and that the jury's claim construction and verdict was supported by
substantial evidence. In support of the jury verdict, Markman pointed to the evidence of his own
testimony as inventor of the patented device, as well as the testimony of his expert witness.
Markman also alleged that the district court misconstrued the term "inventory" in claim 1. Id.
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favor of the meaning revealed by the patent. 275 The issues in the Federal Circuit
thus boiled down to whether the district court acted properly by construing the term
"inventory" as a matter of law notwithstanding a contrary construction given the
term by some of Markman's witnesses and by the jury; and whether the term
"inventory" required as part of its meaning "articles of clothing." 276
The Federal Circuit, in a lengthy opinion, began their analysis by outlining the
two steps in an infringement analysis: a court must first determine the meaning and
scope of the patent claims asserted to be infringed, and then compare the properly
construed claims to the device accused of infringing. 277 The first step of the analysis
278
was at issue in Markman's appeal.
The Federal Circuit acknowledged that there had been some inconsistency in
that court's decisions on the question of whether claim construction was a legal or
factual issue, or a mixed issue of law and facts. 279 After analyzing the lines of cases
that had held that claim construction was a "matter of fact,"280 and those that held
that it was a "matter of law,"281 the court determined that the latter course was
28 2
correct, and that claim construction was a legal issue for the court to decide.
275

Id.

276

Id.

Id. at 976 (citing Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 821 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). The
majority opinion in the Markman case stated that the first step in the analysis in commonly known
as "claim construction" or "claim interpretation." Id. The majority noted that the dissenting opinion
drew a distinction between claim interpretation and claim construction based on the distinction
made in contract law. Id. The majority disagreed with this view, stating that, in their opinion, the
terms were synonymous in patent law. Id. at 976 n.6.
278 Id. at 976.
277

279

Id.

Id. at 97678. The first Federal Circuit case deciding a question of claim construction
explicitly held that the issue was a matter of law. Id. at 976 (citing SSIH Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365, 376 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). One year later, in McGill v. John Zink, 736 F.2d
666 (Fed. Cir. 1984), the Federal Circuit deviated from that precedent and stated that claim
construction could have underlying factual inquiries that must be submitted to a jury. Markman, 52
F.3d at 976 (citing McGill, 736 F.2d at 666). Upon closer scrutiny, however, the Federal Circuit in
Markman downplayed the authorities it had relied upon in McGill, concluding that the primary
authority in the latter case was actually entirely consistent with earlier "matter of law" precedent.
Id. at 977. In MeGill the court had stated that '[i]f... the meaning of the term of art in the claims
is disputed and extrinsic evidence is needed to explain the meaning, construction of the claims could
be left to a jury." McGi], 736 F.2d at 672 (citing Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc., 730 F.2d 753
(Fed. Cir. 1984)). In Markman, the Federal Circuit explained that "[t]he patented invention as
indicated by the language of the claims must first be defined (a question oflaw), and then the trier
of fact must judge whether the claims could be left to a jury." Ma-rkman, 52 F.3d at 976. The
Federal Circuit also gave little credence to the other two cited authorities because they were
contract cases, not patent cases.
Id. (citing Hong Kong Export Credit Ins. Corp. v. Dun &
Bradstreet, 414 F. Supp. 153, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); but ef Butler v. Local Union 823, Int'l
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442, 452 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975)). The
Markman Federal Circuit therefore found Envirotech "entirely consistent" with the earlier "matter
of law precedent. Ma-rkman, 52 F.3d at 976. The court noted that the "significant" line of cases that
relied on McGill and its erroneous interpretation of Envirotech culminated in To]-O-Mati, Inc. v.
Proma Produkt-UndMktg. Gesellschaft m.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Markman, 52 F.3d
at 976. The Markman court also pointed out that the "matter of fact" cases stated, but rarely held,
that there may be jury triable fact issues in claim construction. Id.
281 Mar1kman, 52 F.3d at 977.
Support for the "matter of law" viewpoint was bolstered by
multiple opinions from the Supreme Court that had held that the construction of a patent claim is a
matter of law exclusively for the court. Id. (citing Hogg v. Emerson, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 437, 484 (1848);
280
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The Federal Circuit then tackled Markman's argument that the jury's implied
construction of the claims was correct and that the district court's construction of the
claims was wrong. 28 3 Markman contended that the jury properly considered all the
evidence of record on the disputed term ("inventory") when reaching its conclusion
that the term does not require "articles of clothing."28

4

The court was not convinced

by Markman's arguments, concluding that the district court's construction of the
claims was correct, and using three sources - the claims, the specifications, and the
28 5
prosecution history - to support that conclusion.
Finally, the Federal Circuit addressed the issue of whether claim construction as
a matter of law violated the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. 28 6

The

majority noted that the Seventh Amendment had been judicially interpreted as
extending the right to jury trial to statutory causes of action analogous to common
law actions. 287 The majority acknowledged that the dissenting and one of the
concurring opinions believed that the majority holding deprived plaintiffs, such as
288
Markman, of their constitutional right to a jury trial in patent infringement cases.
The majority disagreed with this conclusion, stating that that part of the
infringement inquiry that construed and determined the scope of the claims in a
Silsby v. Foote, 55 U.S. (14 flow.) 218, 225 (1853); Winans v. New York & Erie R.R. Co., 62 U.S. (21
How.) 88, 100 (1859)). In the Federal Circuit's opinion, those courts had construed patent claims as
a matter of law rather than as a task for the jury because of the long-standing principle of American
law that "construction of a written evidence is exclusively with the court." Id. at 978 (quoting Levy
v. Gadsby, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 180, 186 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.)). The Federal Circuit stated that a
patent qualifies as written evidence because, by statute, a patent must include a written description
of the invention sufficient to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use it. Id. (citing 35
U.S.C. § 112
1 (2000)). In addition, an applicant for a patent must conclude the specification with
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant
regards as his invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112
2 (2000). From that language, the Federal Circuit
concluded that a patent was "uniquely suited" to have its meaning and scope determined entirely by
a court as a matter of law. Markman, 52 F.3d at 978. The court further held that Markman's
principal argument (that the district court erred in taking the issue of claim construction away from
the jury) was legally erroneous because claim construction is a matter of law, and the construction
given the claims is reviewed de novo on appeal. Id.
282 Markman, 52 F.3d at 978.
283 Id.
284Id.
285 Id. at 979 (citing Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(stating that "[t]o ascertain the meaning of claims, we consider three sources: the claims, the
specification, and the prosecution history")); accordAutogiro Co. of Am. v. U.S., 384 F.2d 391, 396-98
(1967).
286 Markman, 52 F.3d at 983-84. The Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides
that "[i]n suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right
of trial by jury shall be preserved." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
287 Markman, 52 F.3d at 984.
288 Id.
As interpreted by the majority, the dissenting opinion (Judge Newman) argued that
there were jury triable factual inquiries involved in determining the scope of a claim, and that this
determination is part of, and often dispositive of, patent infringement questions. Id at 999-1026
(Newman, J., dissenting).
According to the majority, the concurring opinion (Judge Mayer)
acknowledged that claim construction is sometimes a legal question for the court, but nonetheless
found that the majority was trying to indirectly create a "complexity exception" to the right to jury
trial in patent infringement cases that would allow a three judge panel of the Federal Circuit to "do
pretty much what it wants under its de novo retrial." Id. at 984; soo also id. at 989-98 (Mayer, J.,
concurring).
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patent was strictly a legal question for the court, but that this did not disturb the
patentee's right to a jury trial on the application of the properly construed claim.289
After concluding that statutory interpretation was actually the most appropriate
analogy for interpreting patent claims, 290 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
291
court's holding.
Markman appealed the Federal Circuit's holding, arguing "that it was error for
the District Court to substitute its construction of the disputed term "inventory" for
the construction the jury had presumably given it."292 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari, 293 and, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Souter, affirmed the Federal
Circuit's holding, agreeing that the construction of a patent, including terms of art
294
within its claim, are exclusively within the province of the court.
The Supreme Court opinion included an extensive analysis of the Seventh
Amendment issue. The Court first determined that there was no dispute that patent
infringement cases today must be tried to a jury, just as patent cases had been more
than two hundred years ago. 295 This determination led to the second question:
whether a particular issue occurring within a jury trial (e.g., the construction of a
patent claim) is itself necessarily a jury issue. 296 After a thorough historical analysis,
297
the Court concluded that claim construction was not necessarily a jury issue.
289 Id. at 984. In a footnote, the majority emphasized that by also holding that the Federal
Circuit reviewed district court determinations on questions of claim construction under a de novo
standard, the court was merely reiterating the long-recognized appellate review standard for issues
of law in the trial proceeding, regardless of whether the case was tried to a judge or jury. The
majority added that "[c]ontrary to the contentions of the dissenting opinion, this does not 'effect[ I] a
dramatic realignment of jury, judge, and the appellate process."' _d. at 984 n.13.
290 Id. at 987. The dissenting and one of the concurring opinions had attempted to make the
case that construing patent claims is analogous to construing and interpreting contracts, deeds, and
wills. Under this analogy, the argument was made that, although claim construction may be a
question of law for the court, it also involved (or could involve) triable issues of fact. Id. at 984.
291

Id.

292

Markman, 517 U.S. at 376.

293

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 515 U.S. 1192 (1995).

294

Markman, 517 U.S. at 372.

Id. at 377 (citing, e.g., Bramah v. Hardcastle, 1 Carp. P.C. 168 (K.B. 1789)). The Supreme
Court compared the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior
to the merger of the courts of law and equity. Id. (citing Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S.
33, 42 (1989)). The Court stated that it was clear that current patent infringement actions
descended from infringement actions tried at law in the 18th century. Id.
296 Id.
The Court noted that it had repeatedly stated that the answer to the second question
"must depend on whether the jury must shoulder this responsibility as necessary to preserve the
"substanceof the common-law right of trialby jury."' Id. (citing Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412,
426 (1987)) (quoting Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 156 (1973)).
297 Id. at 378-82. The Court determined that the best way to classify a "mongrel practice" such
as construing a term of art following receipt of evidence was by application of the historical method.
Id. at 378. Using that method, the Court found no direct antecedent of modern claim construction in
historical sources. The closest analogue was construction of specifications, and that showed no
established jury practice sufficient to support an argument by analogy that current construction of a
claim should be a guaranteed jury issue. Id. at 379. The Court was not surprised by the absence of
an established practice, given what it termed the "primitive state of jury patent practice at the end
of the 18th century, when juries were still new to the field." Id. The Court went on to comment that
"the state of patent law in the common-law courts before 1800 led one historian to observe that 'the
reported cases are destitute of any decision of importance .... At the end of the eighteenth century,
therefore, the Common Law Judges were left to pick up the threads of the principles of law without
295
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Markman then offered another argument, contending that even if judges were
charged with construing most terms in the patent, the art of defining terms of art
employed in a specification fell within the province of the jury. 298

The Court also

dismissed that argument, concluding that Markman had no scholarly authority for
299
his contention.
In the absence of evidence of common-law practice, the Court considered existing
precedent and functional considerations.30 0 Although the precedent issue was not
clear, the Court concluded that judges were better suited to construct written
documents, even in situations in which credibility was an issue. 30 1 The Court
concluded its opinion by looking at the importance of uniformity as an independent
reason to allocate all issues of construction to the court:
It was just for the sake of such desirable uniformity that Congress created
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as an exclusive appellate court
for patent cases, observing that increased uniformity would "strengthen the
United States patent system in such a way as to foster technological growth
and industrial innovation." Uniformity would be ill-served by submitting
issues of document construction to juries . . . [T]reating interpretive issues

as purely legal will promote (though it will not guarantee)
intrajurisdictional certainty through the application of stare decisis on
those questions not yet subject to interjurisdictional uniformity under the
302
authority of the single appeals court.
Markman thus demonstrates that the Supreme Court in 1996 valued the
Federal Circuit as an important asset in patent law jurisprudence. In the eyes of the
Court, the Federal Circuit, with its status as the exclusive appellate court for patent
cases, provided the uniformity needed to protect patentees and the public, encourage
the inventive genius of prospective inventors, and foster technological growth and
3 03
industrial innovation.
Markman is certainly a "profound en banc Federal Circuit decision"30 4 in patent
law, although at least one commentator has suggested that the Supreme Court's
interest in Markman had less to do with patent law issues and more to do with
the aid of recent and reliable precedents."' Id. at 381 (quoting Hulme, On the Considerationof the
Patent Grant,Pastand Present, 13 L.Q. REV. 313, 318 (1897)). Markman had argued that in order
for 18th century juries to have rendered verdicts on patent cases turning on enablement or novelty,
juries must have acted as definers of patent terms. Id at 382. The Court dismissed this argument,
stating that there was no reason to infer that juries supplied plenary interpretation of written
instruments in patent cases. The Court pointed out that because it was historically known that
judges, not juries, ordinarily construed written documents in other kinds of cases, it was probable
that judges were doing the same thing in patent cases. The Court saw confirmation for this
probability in the fact that the first English reports that began to describe the construction of patent
documents showed judges construing the terms of the specifications. Id.
298Id. at 383.
299 Id.

300Id. at
301Id. at
302Id. at

384-90.
388.
390 (quoting H.R.REP. 97-312, at 20-23 (1981)) (emphasis added).

303
304 Lane

rd5note 257, at 59.
& Pepe, suzpra
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setting general Seventh Amendment precedent. 30 5 Patent law practitioners continue
30 6
to be significantly impacted by Markman s legacy of claim construction hearings,
despite ongoing questions about the effectiveness of that legacy. 30 7 What some
commentators have found most intriguing in Markman, however, are the issues not
addressed by the Court, such as the proper timing of a claim construction
determination, the role of experts, the standard of appellate review of a trial court's
claim construction, and the trial court's role on remand when a construction is
modified on appeal. 30 8 Those issues remained unanswered in Markman, while the
Supreme Court moved on to address another area of patent law.

2. Warner-Jenkinson

In Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.,309 the Supreme
Court again found itself in a substantive patent law dispute. The issue in WarnerJenkinson involved the proper scope of the doctrine of equivalents.3 10 The doctrine of
equivalents states that a product or process that does not literally infringe a patent
claim may nonetheless be found to infringe if there is "equivalence" between the
elements of the accused product or process and the claimed elements of the patented
31 1
invention.
In this case, the plaintiff Davis alleged that his competitor's ultrafiltration
method for purifying dye infringed the plaintiffs patents under the doctrine of
equivalents.3 1 2 A jury found that the defendant, Warner-Jenkinson, had infringed
Davis' patents. 313 The defendant made several post-trial motions, including an
objection to use of a jury, arguing that the doctrine of equivalents was an equitable
doctrine that should be applied by the court.314 The District Court denied each
31 5
motion and entered a permanent injunction against Warner-Jenkinson.

305 See Joan E. Shaffner, The Seventh Amendment Right to Civil Jury Trial: The Supreme
Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away, 31 U. BALT. L. REV. 225, 237 (Spring 2002)
(describing the

Supreme Court's

decision to

grant certiorari

"a rather

unusual move,"

and

suggesting that the Court saw an opportunity in Markman to set general Seventh Amendment
precedent).
306Lane & Pepe, supra note 257, at 59.
'307
See Mark T. Banner, Is Markman Right? 7 Chair's Bulletin 1, The ABA Section of
Intellectual Property Law (Nov. 2002) (questioning whether the policy choices inherent in Markman
should be reconsidered, and whether Markman does strengthen patent law and foster the overall
goal of industrial and economic strength).
See also Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Courts
Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases 15 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2001).
308 See Lane & Pepe, supra note 257, at 63.
'309 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
310 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 21.
311 Id. (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950)). 'I]f
two devices do the same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish substantially the same
result, they are the same, even though they differ in name, form, or shape." Graver Tank, 339 U.S.
at 608 (quoting Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1877)).
312 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 22-23.
313 Id. at 23.
314 Id.
315 Id.
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The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision, with three separate dissents involving
five judges. 316 The majority held that the doctrine of equivalents continued to exist
and that its touchstone is whether substantial differences exist between the patented
process and the allegedly infringing process.

317

Four of the five dissenting judges

318
viewed the doctrine of equivalents as improperly expanding the scope of a claim.
The dissenters agreed that a much narrowed doctrine of equivalents may be applied
in whole or in part by the court. 319 The fifth dissenter reconciled the prohibition
against enlarging the scope of claims and the doctrine of equivalents by applying the
doctrine to each element of a claim, rather than to the overall allegedly infringing
320
product or process.
Judge Plager's dissent was concerned with what he viewed as the Federal
Circuit's failure to answer important questions about the controlling bounds of the
doctrine of equivalents, and the proper roles of judge and jury. 321 Plager felt that the
majority's opinion "neither cabins the availability of the doctrine, nor places
responsibility for determining that availability where it belongs, in the judges who

created the doctrine." 322 Plager concluded his dissent with this warning to his fellow

judges on the Federal Circuit.
This court should accept the duty imposed on us by Congress, as the
exclusive appellate forum short of the Supreme Court, to bring a consistent
and rationalized practice to the doctrine of equivalents. If we had done
that, we would probably have found it appropriate to vacate the decision
before us and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with that opinion. If we somehow go wrong in the details of how
we structure this judicial exercise of equitable power, the Supreme Court,
sooner or later, will correct us. It is better that the Supreme Court tell us
323
that we did our duty incorrectly than that we failed to do it at all.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 324 because of the "significant
disagreement within the Court of Appeals" as to the proper scope of the doctrine of

316 Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (1995).
Dissenting
opinions were filed by Circuit Judge Plager (joined by Chief Judge Archer and Circuit Judges Rich
and Lourie), Circuit Judge Lourie (joined by Circuit Judges Rich and Plager) and Circuit Judge Nies
(joined in part by Chief Judge Archer). Id. at 1514.
'317
Id. at 1518.
318 Id.
Those dissenters included Chief Judge Archer and Circuit Judges Plager, Rich and
Lourie. In the Supreme Court's decision, Justice Thomas stated that the dissenter's view that the

doctrine of equivalents allowed an improper expansion of claim scope was "contrary to this Court's

numerous holdings that it is the claim that defines the invention and gives notice to the public of the
limits of the patent monopoly." Warner-Jnkinson,520 U.S. at 24.
'319 WarnerJenkinson,62 F.3d at 1512.
320 Id. at 1574. In her dissent, Judge Nies stated that "t]he scope is not enlarged if courts do
not go beyond the substitution of equivalent elements." Id.
321 Id. at 1537.
322 Id. at 1544.
323 Id. at 1545.
324 Southeastern Express Co. v. Triad Sys. Corp., 516 U.S. 1145 (1996).
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equivalents. 325 In a unanimous opinion by Justice Thomas, 326 the Supreme Court
provided its interpretation of a doctrine it felt had "taken on a life of its own."327
The Court made short work of the first batch of the defendant's arguments, and
found that the doctrine of equivalents is not inconsistent with statutory
requirements, does not circumvent the patent reissue process, and is not inconsistent
with the primacy of the Patent and Trademark Office. 3 28

The defendant's fourth

argument claimed an implied congressional negation of the doctrine of equivalents
329
because of the "means" claiming provision of the 1952 revision of the Patent Act.
The Court declined to address the policy arguments contained in that argument,
stating that those types of arguments were better addressed to Congress rather than
330
the Court.
The Court then moved on to the meatier issue of prosecution history estoppel.
Prosecution history estoppel is a limitation that prevents a patentee from obtaining,
through the doctrine of equivalents, protection that he could not have obtained, or
chose not to obtain, from the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) at the time the
patent was issued. 331 The Court disagreed with the defendant that the reason for an
332
amendment during patent prosecutions is irrelevant to any subsequent estoppel.
The Court, citing an amicus brief from the PTO, stated that there were a variety of
reasons why that agency could request a change in claim language. 333 The Court
therefore found no substantial cause to require "a more rigid rule" that would invoke
estoppel regardless of the reasons for a change. 334 The Court voiced concerned about
changing the rules midstream, thus upsetting the "various balances the PTO sought

325 Wa±rnor-Jonkinson,520 U.S. at 21.
But at this time the Federal Circuit was taking all
patent appeals. See infra notes 387-389.
326Id. at 19.
327 Id. at 28.
328 Id. at 25-26.
329 Id. at 27.
Section 112
6 of the Patent Act permits patentees to claim a means for
performing a function, rather than a particular product or process. These types of claims are limited
by the requirement that the means exactly perform the specified function. Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae, 1996 WL 172221, at *9.
330 Wa-rnor-Jonkinson, 520 U.S. at 28 (stating that "Congress can legislate the doctrine of
equivalents out of existence any time it chooses. The various policy arguments now made by both
sides are thus best addressed to Congress, not this Court").
331 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, 1996 WL 17222 1, at * 14.
3:32 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 31.
333 Id. The United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)stated that a common reason
why limitations were added to claims during claim prosecution was to steer clear of prior art. Not
every limitation added during prosecution of a patent, however, was done to avoid prior art. For
example, claims could be limited to what was "enabled' as of the date of the patent application, i.e.,
to what could be described in sufficient detail to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to
practice it. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, 1996 WL 172221, at *15, (citing 35
U.S.C. § 112
1 (2000)). Amendments can reflect the scope of what was enabled or to add
specificity, with the goal of fully disclosing the invention rather than limiting the patent right. The
PTO concluded that because it could be appropriate for a patentee not to specify or to claim all
known equivalents, the failure to do so should not necessarily estop it from obtaining protection
under the doctrine of equivalents. Id.
334 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 32.
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to strike when issuing the numerous patents which have not yet expired and which
' 335
would be affected by our decision.
The Court also developed a rule to cover cases in which the record does not
reveal a reason for a claim amendment. In those cases, the court should presume
that the patent applicant had a substantial reason related to patentability for
including the limiting element added by amendment.33 6 Prosecution history estoppel
would therefore bar the doctrine of equivalents to that element. 337 The Court
justified this rule by stating that prosecution history estoppel would place
"reasonable limits on the doctrine of equivalents, and would further insulate the
338
doctrine from any feared conflict with the Patent Act."
The Court then moved on to two other points. The defendant had argued for
intent-based elements in the doctrine of equivalents, but the Court dismissed that
argument, stating that intent plays no role in the application of the doctrine of
equivalents.3 3 9 The Court also reviewed the defendant's argument that the doctrine
of equivalents should be limited to equivalents that are disclosed within the patent
itself.340 The court rejected this argument, stating that "the proper time for
evaluating equivalency - and thus knowledge of interchangeability between elements
3 41
- is at the time of infringement, not at the time the patent was issued."
Finally, the Court declined to take up the jury trial issue. 342 The Federal Circuit
had held that it was for the jury to decide whether the allegedly infringing process
was equivalent to the claimed process.3 43 The Court stated that the defendant's
arguments went more to the alleged inconsistency between the doctrine of
equivalents rather than the role of the jury in applying the doctrine.34 4 Since the jury
trial issue was not squarely presented to the Court, the Court viewed the issue as
"not a question we need decide today." 345
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case back to the Federal Circuit
to consider the doctrine of equivalents requirements discussed by the Court in its
opinion. 346 As an example of its general deference toward the Federal Circuit in this
decision, the Court concluded its opinion by declining to "micromanage" the Federal
Circuit:
With these limiting principles as a backdrop, we see no purpose in going
further and micromanaging the Federal Circuit's particular word choice for
analyzing equivalence. We expect that the Federal Circuit will refine the
formulation of the test for equivalence in the orderly course of case-by-case

'33Id. at n.6. Justice Ginsburg's concurrence was also concerned about this point and praised
the majority for being "sensitive to [the] problem" of existing patentees. Id. at 41.
336 Id. at 33.
'337
Id.
338 Id.
331 Id. at 37.
30 Id.
341 Id.
34 2 Id. at 38.
343

Id.

344Id.

345Id. at 39.
346Id.at 41.
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determinations, and we leave such refinement to that court's sound
3 47
judgment in this area of its special expertise.
The Court also went out of its way to defer to the Federal Circuit on the jury
trial issue. Stating that the Supreme Court was "confident that the Federal Circuit
can remedy the problem," the Court left it "to the Federal Circuit [to determine] how
best to implement procedural improvements to promote certainty, consistency, and
348
reviewability to this area of the law."
Although the Court itself formulated new standards for prosecution history
estoppel, it again showed deference to the Federal Circuit on this issue. The Court
merely asked the lower court to determine whether reasons for a portion of the
amendment were offered or not, and whether further opportunity to establish such
349
reasons would be proper.
Even with this deferential tone, the Court's "foray into substantive prosecution
history estoppel standard-setting" has been viewed by some as an unwitting plunge
into "unreasonably rough waters." 350 A commentator has criticized the Court for
apparently being unaware that an entire body of case law had already developed
around the question of the proper scope of estoppel under the prosecution history
estoppel doctrine, 351 and warned that "the potential for [other] gaffes of this sort" was
especially acute due to the Court's role as overseer of an expert tribunal in a complex
area of the law. 352 A better solution may have been for the Court to direct the
Federal Circuit to fashion the appropriate substantive standard, instead of trying to
353
fashion one on its own.
Overall, the Court's opinion in this case was generally deferential to the Federal
Circuit. The Court noted that it relied on the Federal Circuit for the day to day
development and administration of patent law. 354 It also recognized the Federal
Circuit's "special expertise" in patent law, 355 which justified allowing that court the
autonomy to determine how best to promote certainty, consistency, and reviewability
in patent law. 356 The Court's weak spot in this case was its formulation of a new
prosecution history estoppel standard, and the Court arguably erred the same way a
year later in Pfaffwhen it again attempted to fashion another substantive test from
scratch.

347

Id. at 40 (emphasis added).
Id. at 39 n.8.

'318
349 Id.at

350Janis,

34.
supranote 238, at 414.

Id. at 414 n.123.
Id. at 415.

'351
352

3 Id.
354 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40.
35 Id.
356

Td. at 39 n.8.
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3. Pfaff
Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.3 5 7 involved the issue of whether the commercial
marketing of a newly invented product marks the beginning of the one year "on-sale
bar" restriction of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b),358 even though the invention had not yet been
reduced to practice. 359 The plaintiff, Wayne Pfaff, obtained a patent on a computer
chip socket. 360 After his patent issued, Pfaff brought an infringement action against
the defendant, Wells Electronics, the manufacturer of a competing socket. 361 The
District Court initially entered summary judgment for the defendant, but the Federal
362
Circuit reversed and remanded for trial because issues of fact were in dispute.
After a full evidentiary hearing, the District Court held that two claims were invalid
and four claims were valid.3 63 Of the four valid claims, the District Court found that
3 64
three were infringed by various models of the defendant's sockets.
The Federal Circuit reversed the District Court and found all six claims
invalid.3 65 Four of the claims were found invalid under § 102(b) because the device
had been offered for sale on a commercial basis more than one year before the patent
application was filed.3 66 The Federal Circuit held that the one-year period should

begin to run as long as the invention was "substantially complete at the time of sale,"
even though the invention had not yet been reduced to practice.3 67 The remaining
two claims described a feature that had not been included in Pfaffs initial design,
and the Federal Circuit concluded as a matter of law that the additional feature was
not patentable itself because it was "an obvious addition to the prior art."368 The
Federal Circuit stated that the "prior art" included Pfaffs first four claims.

369

In finding the claims invalid, the Federal Circuit used a "substantially complete
based on the totality of the circumstances" test.3 70 This test only required that the
invention be substantially complete before it could be placed on sale.3 71 In UMC
357 525 U.S. 55 (1998), rehearingdenied,525 U.S. 1094 (1999).
358 "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless ... the invention was patented or described in
a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more
than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States .
35 U.S.C. §
102(b) (2000).
'359 Pfaff 525 U.S. at 57.
360o
Id.
3 1 Id. at 59.
'362 Id.

3 3 Id.
3 4 Id.
'365

Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 124 F.3d 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

366

Pfaff 525 U.S. at 60.

30G7
Id.
'368

Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000)).
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
described . . . if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented
and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in

the art to which said subject matter pertains.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
3(9 Pfaff 525 U.S. at 60.
370 Pfaff, 124 F.3d at 1434.
371

Id.
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Electronics Co. v. U., 3 72 the Federal Circuit had rejected the "reduced to practice"
test, which would have required that an invention be reduced to practice prior to
being placed on sale. 373

After analyzing the facts under

the totality of the

circumstances test, the Federal Circuit determined that Pfaffs invention had been
substantially complete, and that his infringement claims were therefore invalid
374
under the on-sale bar.
The Supreme Court decided to grant certiorari in the case for two reasons: first,
because of concerns over the wording of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b); 37 5 and second, to
ostensibly resolve a circuit split. 376

The Court framed the issue as whether the

commercial marketing of a newly invented product marks the beginning of the one
year "on-sale bar" restriction of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), even though the invention had not
yet been reduced to practice. 377 In framing the issue this way, the Court agreed to
consider whether the Federal Circuit's "substantially complete based on the totality
of the circumstances" test should be rejected in favor of the "reduced to practice" test,
despite the fact that the latter test had been rejected by the Federal Circuit years
37 8
before in UMC E/ectronics.
The Court's analysis became a battle of the competing tests. The Court first
rejected the Federal Circuit's totality of the circumstances test, citing its uncertainty,
vagueness,3 79 and lack of support from the statutory text.380 The Court then went on
to also reject the already-rejected "reduced to practice" test. Beginning its analysis
372 816 F.2d 647 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

Se gonerally William C. Rooklidge & W. Gerard von

Hoffman, Reduction to Practice, Experimental Use, and the 'On Sale' and Public Use' Bars to
Patentability,63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1 (1998) (recounting UMCand its history).
373 According to former Chief Judge Markey, the Federal Circuit "concluded, after a careful
examination of the earlier case law, that reduction to practice of the claimed invention has not been,
and should not be made, an absolute requirement of the on-sale bar." Instead, the Federal Circuit
advocated a "totality of the circumstances" test that should be considered and weighed against the
four policies underlying 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Those policies included:
(1) against removing inventions from the public that the public has justifiably
come to believe are freely available to all as a consequence of prolonged sales
activity; (2) favoring prompt and widespread disclosure of new inventions to the
public; (3) preventing the inventor from commercially exploiting the exclusivity of
his invention substantially beyond the statutorily authorized 17-year period; and
(4) giving the inventor a reasonable amount of time following sale activity (set by
statute as one year) to determine whether a patent is a worthwhile investment.
MARKEY, supra note 8, at 1689. These policies were first identified in Note, Now Guidelines for
Applying the On Sale Bar to Patentability,24 STAN. L. REV. 730 (1972), and reexamined in light of
the Federal Circuit cases in William C. Rooklidge, The On Sale and Public Use Bars to
Patentability:The Policies Reexamined, 1 FED. CIR. B.J. 7 (1991).
'37Pfaff 124 F.3d at 1434.
375 The Court's stated reason for granting certiorari was because the "the text of § 102(b)
makes no reference to 'substantial completion' of an invention." Pfaif 525 U.S. at 60.
'376Id.,see infra note 387 (suggesting that the circuit split was "contrived").
377 Pfaff 525 U.S. at 57; see Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chem. Corp., 276 U.S. 358, 383
(1928) ("Aprocess is reduced to practice when it is successfully performed. A machine is reduced to
practice when it is assembled, adjusted and used. A manufacture is reduced to practice when it is
completely manufactured. A composition of matter is reduced to practice when it is completely
composed").
378 See supra note 373 and accompanying text.
379 Pfaff 525 U.S. at 65. ("A rule that makes the timeliness of an application depend on the
date when an invention is 'substantially complete' seriously undermines the interest in certainty").
380 Id.at 66.
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by touching on the validity of Alexander Graham Bell's telephone patents in 1888's
The Telephone Cases,38 1 the Court stated that inventions may be patented before
they are reduced to practice. 38 2 The Court cited the facts of The Telephone Cases and
the facts at issue in Pfaff as examples of cases where a court could determine that
"an invention is complete and ready for patenting before it has actually been reduced
to practice."

383

Having rejected the competing tests,

384

the Court now fashioned its own two-

prong test for on-sale bar determinations. Under the new Supreme Court test, the
product must (i) be the subject of a commercial offer for sale; and (2) be ready for
patenting. 385 Applying this new "ready for patenting" test, the Court agreed with the
Federal Circuit that Pfaffs claims were invalid. Pfaffs invention had been on sale
for more than one year in the U.S. before his patent application was filed, and the
invention thus fell afoul of the restrictions of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).386
The Court's sojourn into substantive patent law has been criticized on several
fronts. First, the Court's rationale to grant certiorari to resolve a circuit split has
been criticized as "contrived." 38 7 Regional circuit authority over patent law decisions
'81sThe Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1 (1888).
Alexander Graham Bell's patents were upheld
even though Bell had filed his application before constructing a working telephone. Then Chief
Justice Waite reasoned that "t]he law does not require that a discoverer or inventor, in order to get
a patent for a process, must have succeeded in bringing his art to the highest degree of perfection. It
is enough if he describes his method with sufficient clearness and precision to enable those skilled in
the matter to understand what the process is, and if he points out some practicable way of putting it
into operation." Id. at 35-36.
382 Pfaff 525 U.S. at 61.
383 Id. at 67. In accompanying footnote 12, the Court went on to explain that "[s]everal of this
Court's early decisions stating that an invention is not complete until it has been reduced to practice
are best understood as indicating that the invention's reduction to practice demonstrated that the
concept was no longer in an experimental phase." Id. at n. 12. But see Zi Wong, The Experimental
Stage Doctrine: The Quiet Death of an Experimental Use Heresy, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC'Y 691 (Oct. 2000) (discussing the Federal Circuit's successful efforts to excise the experimental
use doctrine "heresy" in 1999). The experimental use doctrine had never enjoyed robust health, and
was arguably kept on life support in the Federal Circuit through the tenacious efforts of Judge
Newman. Id. at 709. The doctrine finally officially expired in a footnote to Judge Rich's final
opinion. ld. at 712 (citing Scaltech, Inc. v. Tetra, L.L.C., 178 F.3d 1378, 1384 n.1 (Fed.Cir. 1999))
("[T]he experimental use doctrine ...has been rejected by both this court and the Supreme Court").
But announcement of the doctrine's ill health and subsequent demise had apparently not reached
the Supreme Court, who found themselves, in Pfaff wandering back into the experimental stage
doctrine heresy.
384 The Court had also rejected a test offered by the U.S. in their amicus brief. See Brief of
Amicus Curiae United States, No. 97-1130, 1996 WL 246707, at *11-*13 (1998). This alternate
analysis was basically that offered in William C. Rooklidge, Application of the On Sale Bar to
Activities PerformedBefore Reduction to Practice,72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 543 (1990),
and urged in Judge Bryson's concurrence in Seal Flex, Ine. v.Athletic Track & Court Constr., 98
F.3d 1318, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1996) when Judge Bryson proposed a test in which inventors themselves
would decide whether their inventions required more testing, or if they were sufficiently confident in
the invention to offer it for sale. Id. The Supreme Court rejected the Bryson test in Pfaff citing "the
possibility of additional development after the offer for sale" that presumably could result in
avoidance of the bar. Pfaff 525 U.S. at 67.
385 Pfaff 525 U.S. at 67.
386 Id. at 68.
387 See Janis, supra note 238, at 411:

The conflict seems largely contrived; after all, it is a conflict between the Federal
Circuit and regional appellate tribunals no longer having jurisdiction over the on-
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had been superceded by creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982.388 Furthermore, the
Federal Circuit had rejected the "reduced to practice" test back in 1987, and there
were no clear indications that the test was considered a viable contender again in
1998.389

The Court's attempt to fashion its own substantive test from scratch has also
been viewed skeptically by commentators. One reason for this skepticism is that the
new test is viewed as less friendly to inventors, 390 both "garage inventors," like Pfaff,
and large corporations engaging in development activities. 391
In fact, large
corporations are more likely to be negatively impacted by the Pfafftest.392 Hightechnology corporations often use an incremental development process that blurs the
"ready for patenting" test.393 In addition, large corporations are more likely to
engage in joint development projects that may inappropriately trigger the on-sale
bar.3 94 The Court's new test has also been criticized as failing to consider fully the
395
policies behind the on-sale bar rule.
The new "ready for patenting" test has also not been conclusively viewed as a
more certain test than the disparaged "reduced to practice" or "totality of the
circumstances" tests. The Court's test has been criticized as failing to produce the
396
predictability and certainty desired, and effecting no real change in the law.
District courts have diverged significantly from the Supreme Court's test, and have
held that the offer for sale of the mere conception of the invention is sufficient for the
39 7
bar to apply.

sale bar question. Moreover, it is doubtful whether there was any perception
among patent practitioners of the existence of any genuine conflict; rather the
Federal Circuit had expressly considered and definitely rejected the reduction to
practice standard in UMC Electronics and the UMC Electronics approach was not
questioned in subsequent Federal Circuit opinions. Thus, the Supreme Court was
not choosing between extant competing rules.
Id. But in Holmes Group v. Vornado (discussed in Part.V), the Supreme Court recently ruled that
jurisdiction over appeals in which patent claims are raised in the counterclaim, as opposed to the
complaint, are to be routed to the appropriate regional circuit instead of the Federal Circuit. As a
result, the Supreme Court's reason for granting certiorari in Pfaffmay have seemed contrived in

2001, but looks less so in 2003.
388Id.
389 Id.

'90 William C. Rooklidge & Russell B. Hill, The Law of UnintendedConsequences.*The On Sale
BarAfterPfaffv. Wells Electronics, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 163, 167 (Mar. 2000).
391 Lucius L. Lockwood, Ready, Set, Patent! How the Supreme Court in Pfaff v. Wells
Electronics Jumped the Gun, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 399, 406 (Summer 2000).
392 Id.

393 Id. at 409.
'M94
Id.

395 Id. at 415.
396 Timothy R. Holbrook, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: Implieations
ofPfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc. and the Quest for Predictabilityin the On -saleBar, 15 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 933, 933 (2000).
397 Id. The courts have also created two versions of the on-sale bar: the "anticipatory" version
(where what is offered for sale is precisely the same as what is later claimed in the patent), and the
'obviousness" version (where what is offered for sale varies from what is later claimed, but that
variation would be obvious to one skilled in the relevant technological art). This two-version
approach further undermines predictability and the other policies that underlie the on-sale bar. Id.
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Finally, application of the new test has led to various unintended
consequences. 398 Although the courts and commentators are still in the process of
identifying these unintended consequences, several have already been articulated.
These include an increase in trial courts holding patents invalid under the on sale
bar on summary judgement; an increase in the Federal Circuit's holding patents
invalid under the on sale bar on appeal; and the rejection of arguments on which
inventors had long relied to avoid application of the on sale bar.3 99 Although the
broad goal of the Court's new test was "to bring greater certainty to the analysis of
the on-sale bar,"400 that goal has yet to be reached.

4. Festo
The most recent example of decreasing Supreme Court deference to the Federal
Circuit in substantive patent law cases is Festo v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co, Ltd. 401 This May 2002 decision has been hailed as a landmark ruling
in the area of patent law, 40 2 and illustrates the Court's increasing impatience with
the Federal Circuit in patent law cases.
4 3
The issue in Festo involved the extent to which the doctrine of equivalents
should be applied in patent cases. Festo Corporation was the owner of two patents
for an industrial device. 40 4 The Patent and Trademark Office initially rejected
Festo's first patent application because of defects in the patent's description. 40 5 The
application was amended to add new limitations, specifically that the device would
contain a pair of one-way sealing rings, and that the outer sleeve would be made of a
magnetizable material. 40 6 The second patent application was also amended to add
the sealing rings limitation. 40 7 After Festo began selling its patented device, the
defendants entered the market with a similar device that incorporated a two-way
408
sealing ring and a nonmagnetizable sleeve.
Festo filed suit, claiming that the defendant's device was so similar to Festo's
device that it infringed Festo's patent under the doctrine of equivalents. The District
Court agreed with Festo, as did an initial Federal Circuit panel. 40 9 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari, vacated and remanded, citing the rule in the recentlydecided Warner-Jenkinson.410 Warner-Jenkinson stated that competitors could rely
on the prosecution history to estop a patentee from recapturing subject matter

398 Rooklidge

& Hill, supra note 390, at 167.

'399Id.
400

Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1047 (2001).

401 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002).
402 Sabra Chartrand, Taking Another Look at a Supreme Court Ruling on Inventors and

Copycats, N.Y. TIMES ABSTRACTS 2 (June 3, 2002).
403 See supra note 311 and accompanying text for a definition of doctrine of equivalents.
404Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1832.
405Id.
40(;
Id.

407
408

Id.
Id.

409Festo v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co, Ltd., 72 F.3d 857 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

410 520 U.S. 1111 (1997) (citing 520 U.S. 17 (1997)).
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surrendered by amendment as a condition of obtaining the patent. 411 On remand, the
en banc Federal Circuit reversed and held (8-4) that prosecution estoppel could apply
to any amendment made to satisfy the Patent Act's requirements, not just to
412
amendments made to avoid the prior art.
The Federal Circuit majority acknowledged that its controversial decision would
overrule past precedent. In previous cases, the court held that prosecution history
esoppel constituted a flexible bar that foreclosed some, but not all, claims of
equivalence, depending on the purpose of the amendment and the alterations in the
text. 413 The Federal Circuit justified overruling this past precedent on the ground
that the court's case-by-case approach had proved unworkable. 41 4 The Federal
Circuit also defended its decision by emphasizing that "Congress specifically created
the Federal Circuit to resolve issues unique to patent law." 41 5 Issues such as the one
at bar were "properly reserved for [the Federal Circuit] to answer with 'its special
expertise."' 41 6 In the words of Judge Schall, writing for the majority:
We are the court primarily responsible for the state of patent law, and the
Supreme Court has pronounced it our duty to 'best implement procedural
improvements to promote certainty, consistency, and reviewability to this
area of the law.' 417 It is time for us to 'think outside the box' and restore the
418
doctrine of equivalents to its original equitable function and purpose.
Four judges dissented from the Federal Circuit's decision to think outside the
box and adopt a complete bar. 41 9 In four separate opinions, the dissenting judges
argued that "the majority's decision to overrule precedent was contrary to WarnerJenkinson and would unsettle the expectations of many existing patentees." 420 The
most vocal dissenter was Judge Michel, who argued that the Federal Circuit's new
position would require it to disregard eight older decisions of the Supreme Court, as
421
well as more than fifty of its own cases.

Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1832.
Festo v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co, Ltd., 234 F.3d 558, 574 (Fed.Cir. 2000).
413 Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1832.
414 Festo, 234 F.3d at 575. The Federal Circuit defined "workable rules" as those that "can be
relied upon to produce consistent results and give rise to a body of law that provides guidance to the
marketplace on how to conduct its affairs. After our long experience with the flexible bar approach,
we conclude that its 'workability' is flawed." Id.
415 Id. at 571 (citing Markman, 517 U.S. at 390); for a discussion of Markman see Part IV.B.1.
416 Id.at 572 (citing Warner-Jenkinson,520 U.S. at 40).
417 Id.at 595 (citing Warner-Jenkinson,520 U.S. at 39 n.8).
418 Id,
419 See generally Festo, 234 F.3d at 598-642. The separate dissenters included Judge Michel
(see generally id. at 598-619); Judge Rader (see generally id.at 61920); Judge Linn (see generally
id. at 620-29); and Judge Newman (see generallyid.at 630-42).
420 Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1837.
421 Id. Judge Michel had multiple concerns about the majority opinion:
In Warne-r-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court encouraged our court to 'refine the
formulation of the test for equivalence.'
I am convinced, however, that the
majority's new 'complete bar rule,' far from being merely such a refinement,
contravenes consistent Supreme Court authority. Not only does the majority's
new rule directly contradict one Supreme Court holding, but it undermines the
411

412
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2001.422

The two issues presented in

the Supreme Court were whether any equivalents were available for limitations
added by amendment generally; and whether estoppel arose for all kinds of
patentability-related amendments regardless of the specific reason for the
423
amendment.
On May 28, 2002, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice
Kennedy, vacated the Federal Circuit's opinion. The Supreme Court agreed with the
Federal Circuit that "a narrowing amendment made to satisfy any requirement of the
Patent Act may give rise to an estoppel." 424 On the more important and controversial
issue of the effect of such an amendment, however, the Supreme Court rejected the
Federal Circuit's absolute bar approach. Instead, the Court concluded that "[tihough
prosecution history estoppel can bar challenges to a wide range of equivalents, its
reach requires an examination of the subject matter surrendered by the narrowing
425
amendment."
In its decision, the Supreme Court had harsh words for the Federal Circuit. The
Supreme Court criticized the Federal Circuit for "ignor[ing] the guidance of WarnerJenkinson, which instructed the courts to be cautious before adopting changes that
disrupt the settled expectations of the inventing community." 426 The Supreme Court

noted that it had "made it clear that the doctrine of equivalents and the rule of
prosecution history estoppel are settled law." 427

As such, the responsibility for

428
changing those legal rules rested not with the Federal Circuit, but with Congress.
The Court seemed particularly persuaded by Federal Circuit Judge Michel's warning
cry that the Federal Circuit's complete bar would require the Federal Circuit to
429
disregard eight older decisions of the Supreme Court and fifty of its own cases.

legal standard that the Supreme Court has consistently articulated in seven other
cases for determining the scope of such estoppel.

Festo, 234 F.3d at 598 (citations omitted). Judge Michel added that he believed the Federal Circuit
owed "greater deference to our past interpretations of Supreme Court law, or a better explanation of

why our case law is suddenly seen as 'unworkable."'

Id. at 612. He ended his lengthy dissent by

stating that

[i]n the face of over one hundred years of Supreme Court case law, today's en bane
majority lacks authority to establish a complete bar rule. The majority also
abruptly abandons eighteen years of unvarying Federal Circuit precedent as

articulated in over fifty decisions, and does so without showing their error.
Id. at 619.
422 Festo v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
423 Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1835.
421Id. at 1839.
425 Id. at 1840.

Kogyo Kabushiki Co, Ltd., 533 U.S. 915 (2001).

4260Id. at 1841. See also supra note 335 (discussing the Court's concern in Warner-Jenkinson
over changing patent laws "mid-stream").

427 Festo, 122
428 Id.

S. Ct. at 1841.

429 Id. at 1837. It is interesting to see how the Supreme Court explicitly supports its opinions
by referencing language from Federal Circuit dissents, such as language here from Judge Michel's
lengthy dissent. In 1996, Chief Judge Helen Wilson Nies discussed the importance of dissenting
opinions to Federal Circuit opinions. Judge Nies concluded that Federal Circuit dissents are
important because they provide impetus for Supreme Court review, delineate a scholarly basis for
disagreements, and are the sole means by which contradictory positions on law are presented fully
and without personal bias to the Supreme Court. See Nies, supra note 65, at 1519.
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As further indication of its displeasure with the Federal Circuit, the Supreme
Court did not remand the case back to the Federal Circuit to allow that court to
further develop the law, as had been done in Warner-Jenkinson.430 Instead, the
Supreme Court returned the case to the Federal Circuit (or the District Court) for
43 2
factual analysis only, 431 consistent with the Court's opinion.
The Festo decision dramatically illustrates how the Supreme Court's deference
toward the Federal Circuit in substantive patent law decisions has changed in the
last twenty years. In 1982, the new Federal Circuit had enough clout and confidence
to successfully repudiate most of the Supreme Court's previous patent law rulings,
with the tacit approval of the Court. 433 By 2002, no Federal Circuit patent rulings
were surviving Court review.
The Festo Court's criticisms of the Federal Circuit were numerous. The Court's
major concern was the Federal Circuit's decision to explicitly ignore the guidance of
precedent.43 4 That decision appeared to irritate an increasingly impatient Supreme
Court, who responded by delivering the intellectual equivalent of a dope slap. What
part of Warner-Jenkinson, the Court seemed to say, did the Federal Circuit not
understand?
Warner-Jenkinson had been decided by the Court only five years
earlier, and both the majority and concurring opinions in that case had stressed the
435
importance of respecting the settled expectations of the patenting community.
What made the Federal Circuit think it could get away with ignoring the lessons of
that case?
The Court's open irritation with the Federal Circuit manifested itself in other
ways in the Festo decision. The Court criticized attempts by the Federal Circuit to
adopt changes that were more appropriately under the purview of Congress. 4 3 6 Many
commentators have echoed this criticism. The Federal Circuit's decision to establish
a complete bar has been viewed as an attempt by the court to wrongfully dabble in
legislating, or, as described by one bar association, of treating its legislative mandate
43 7
as a mandate to legislate.

430 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 41.
431 The lingering factual questions that remained were "whether petitioner can demonstrate

that the narrowing amendments did not surrender the particular equivalents at issue. On these
questions, respondents may well prevail, for the sealing rings and the composition of the sleeve both
were noted in the prosecution history." Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1842.
4:32 Id.
at 1843. On Sept. 20, 2002, the Federal Circuit recalled its mandate of Dec. 20, 2000
and reinstated the appeal pursuant to the Court's remand. The Federal Circuit ordered the parties
to submit briefs on four specific issues, and also invited briefs from other interested parties on two of
the four issues. See 2002 WL 31002602.
433

See supra notes 92-94.

For commentary on what is perceived as a regular practice of the Federal Circuit in
ignoring the guidance of precedent see William C. Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil, En Bane Review,
Horror Pleni, and the Resolution of Patent Law Confliets, 40 SANTA CLARA. L. REV. 787 (2000);
William C. Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil, JudicialHyperactivity: The FederalCircuit Discomfort
with its Appellate Role, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725 (2000); Thomas G. Field 11, The Role ofStare
Decisis in the FederalCircuit,9 FED. CIR. B.J. 203 (1999); Matthew F. Weil & William C. Rooklidge,
434

Stare Un-Decisis: The Sometimes Rough Treatment of Precedent in Federal Circuit DecisionMaking, 80 J. PAT. &TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 791 (1998).
43 See supra note 335 and accompanying text.
436 Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1841.
437 Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association 10 (Aug. 2001).
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Others have questioned the Federal Circuit's practice of soliciting briefs by the
parties and amiei on abstract questions not even raised by the parties, and then
creating new rules of law in response to those abstract questions.43 8 Although the
issues raised by the parties in Festo did not require the Federal Circuit to develop or
announce new general principles of patent law, the court first propounded five
abstract questions, 439 and then enunciated a series of rules intended to govern the
decision made in Festo, as well as all future prosecution history estoppel cases
involving claim amendments. 440 The court engaged in this rule-making despite the
fact that Congress, the body better equipped to develop and announce new patent law
principles, had not felt it necessary to make adjustments to the doctrine of
441
equivalents or prosecution history estoppel.
438 Brief of Amicus Curiae Federal Circuit Bar Association in Support of Festo Corporation's
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 1
113, 114 (2001) [hereinafter FCBA Brief].
439 The five abstract questions raised by the Federal Circuit included:
1. For the purposes of determining whether an amendment to a claim
creates prosecution history estoppel, is a "substantial reason related to
patentability," limited to those amendments made to overcome prior art
under § 102 and § 103, or does "patentability" mean any reason affecting the
issuance of a patent?
2. Under Warner-Jenkinson,should a "voluntary" claim amendmentone not required by the examiner or made in response to a rejection by an
examiner for a stated reason - create prosecution history estoppel?
3. If a claim amendment creates prosecution history estoppel, under
Warnor Jenkznson what range of equivalents, if any, is available under the
doctrine of equivalents for the claim element so amended?
4. When "no explanation [for a claim amendment] is established," thus
invoking the presumption of prosecution history estoppel under Warno -r
Jenkinson, what range of equivalents, if any, is available under the doctrine
of equivalents for the claim element so amended?
5. Would a judgment of infringement in this case violate Warno -r
Jenkinson's requirement that the application of the doctrine of equivalents
"is not allowed such broad play as to eliminate [an] element in its entirety."
In other words, would such a judgment of infringement, post WarnorJenkinson, violate the "all elements" rule?
Festo, 234 F.3d at 563 (citations omitted).
440 FCBA Brief, supra note 437, at 125.
In Festo, the court expanded the doctrine of
prosecution history estoppel and narrowed the doctrine of equivalents by announcing, in relevant
part, the following new rules of law:
1. In determining what is a "substantial reason related to
patentability," the term "patentability" is not limited to overcoming prior art
under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, but includes amendments required under §
101 (requirement of patentable subject matter) and § 112 (requirement of
specification).
2. An amendment made voluntarily by a patentee, and not just
required by the examiner, creates prosecution history estoppel just as a
required amendment does.
3. If a claim amendment creates prosecution history estoppel, then no
range of equivalents is available for the amended claim element - i.e.,
prosecution history estoppel operates as a "complete bar" to infringement by
equivalents.
Id. at 115 (citations omitted).
441 Id. at 126 n.10.
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The Federal Circuit also acted like a legislative body by justifying its conclusions
through public policy arguments. 442 Unlike an actual legislative body, however, the
Federal Circuit does not have the resources to effectively weigh the costs and benefits
of such public policies. 443 More importantly, the court does not have the mandate
from Congress to do so.
A final indication of the Supreme Court's general displeasure was the Court's
decision to discount the Federal Circuit's analysis of the case and instead conduct
their own analysis. The Court also limited the scope of the Federal Circuit's future
impact on the case by remanding the case for factual analysis only, thus denying the
Federal Circuit the opportunity to devise a new test. By these acts, the Court gave
the Federal Circuit little credit for what it had done, and little autonomy in what it
was now allowed to do.
Festo can be seen as the Court's wake-up call to the Federal Circuit. Although
the Court was willing, in Warner-Jenkinson,to defer to the Federal Circuit's greater
technical expertise, this willingness appeared conditional on the lower court's
recognition of certain guidelines erected by the Supreme Court. In a sense, the
Supreme Court's previous patent rulings had resulted in the establishment of
minimal, but defined, boundaries in patent law jurisprudence, with the Court
allowing the Federal Circuit a healthy amount of leeway within those boundaries.
The lower court's insistence on moving outside of these boundaries seemed to prompt
the Court's impatient holding in Festo. It also seemed to play a role in the next
patent law decision from the Court, a decision that could be the most significant in
the Federal Circuit's twenty-year history.

V. TEMPTED BY THE FRUIT OF ANOTHER: THE SUDDEN REVIVAL OF THE
REGIONAL CIRCUITS AFTER HOLMES GROUP v. VORNADO
On June 3, 2002, just one week after Festo was decided, the Supreme Court, in
Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air CirculationSystems, Inc., 444 dealt another blow to
the Federal Circuit. In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court declared
that the Federal Circuit does not have jurisdiction over all cases involving a patent
law claim, thus re-opening the door to regional circuit (and even state court)
445
influence in patent law jurisprudence.
Vornado began as a trade dress suit. In 1992, Vornado, a manufacturer of
patented fans and heaters, sued fellow fan manufacturer Duracraft Corp. (Vornado
), claiming that the grill design in Duracraft's fans infringed Vernado's trade
dress. 446 The Tenth Circuit disagreed, holding that Vernado had no protectible trade-

442

Id. at 126.

Id.

M:3

444

122 S. Ct. 1889 (2002).

445 Holmos Group, 122 S. Ct. at 1895.
446 Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1141
(citing Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., Civ. Action No. 92-1453-WEB (D.
Kan. 1992)). Vornado's complaint alleged that Duracraft's grill design constituted non-functional
trade dress subject to regulation and injunction under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). Id.
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dress rights in the grill design. 447 Despite this determination, Vornado filed a
complaint with the International Trade Commission in November 1999, accusing
Holmes Group of violating the same grill design that the Tenth Circuit had already
held unprotectible. 448 Holmes Group responded by filing an action in District Court,
seeking a declaratory judgment that its products did not infringe Vornado's trade
dress, and an injunction restraining Vornado from accusing Holmes Group of trade
dress infringement in any promotional materials. 449 A patent issue finally surfaced
in Vornado's answer, which asserted a compulsory counterclaim alleging patent
infringement.

450

The District Court agreed with Holmes Group and granted the declaratory
judgment and injunction, stating that the collateral estoppel effect of Vornado I
precluded Vornado from relitigating its claim of trade-dress rights in the grill
design. 451 The court was not swayed by the Federal Circuit's 1999 decision in
Midwest Industries,Inc. v. Karavan Trailers,Inc., 452 which disagreed with the Tenth
Circuit's reasoning in Vornado L.45 3 The District Court stated that Midwest
447Id. (citing Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir.
1995)). The Tenth Circuit declined to extend trade dress protection to Vornado's grill design because
it was "a significant inventive element of Vornado's patented fans [and therefore] cannot be
protected as trade dress." Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1510. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the
case on Jan. 8, 1996. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 516 U.S. 1067
(1996). The district court subsequently entered final judgment by dismissing Vornado's trade dress
claim with prejudice ( Vornado 1), and awarding costs against Vornado. Holmes Group, 93 F. Supp.
2d at 1142.
448 Holmes Group, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 1141.
449)
Holmes Group, 122 S. Ct. at 1892.
450Id.
451 Holmes Group, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 1145. "All of the procedural machinations and intercircuit
intrigue implicated by this action cannot obscure a central truth: Vornado I constitutes a final and
valid judgment of this court and the law upon which that judgment was based remains unchanged.
Under such circumstances, this court will not refuse to give effect to its own prior judgment." Id. at
1143.
452 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
453The Federal Circuit said that the Tenth Circuit stood alone in holding that trade dress
protection is unavailable for a product configuration that is claimed in a patent, and is a described,
inventive aspect of the patented invention, even if the configuration is nonfunctional. Midwest
Industries, 175 F.3d at 1364. In Midwest Industries, the Federal Circuit also abruptly abandoned
the practice of applying regional circuit law in resolving questions involving the relationship
between law and other federal and state law rights. Id. at 1358. In 1985, the Federal Circuit had
held that when it was called upon to resolve questions of whether patent law preempts state law
causes of action or conflicts with other federal laws, the court would apply the law of the appropriate
regional circuit. Cable Electric Products, Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1029-33 (Fed. Cir.
1985). The Federal Circuit abandoned this practice in 1999 in Midwest Industries,however, holding
that "[h]enceforth, we will apply our own law to such questions." Midwest Industries, 175 F.3d at
1358. The court justified this change on the grounds of uniformity and issue expertise, stating that
to do otherwise would be an "abdication" of the Federal Circuit's responsibilities in patent law
jurisprudence:
We recognize, of course, that questions involving conflicts between patent law and
other causes of action can and do arise in cases over which this court does not
have appellate jurisdiction - cases in which claims under the Lanham Act or state
law claims are not joined with a claim under the Patent Act. As a result, there is
a risk that district courts and litigators could find themselves confronting two
differing lines of authority when faced with conflicts between patent law and state
or federal trademark claims .... Nonetheless . . .we think that as the sole
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Industries did not constitute a change in the Tenth Circuit law of trade dress, and
therefore did not warrant relitigation of Vornado's trade dress claim.4 54 The court

also stayed proceedings related to Vornado's counterclaim, stating that the
counterclaim would be dismissed if the judgment and injunction were affirmed on
455
appeal.
Vornado appealed to the Federal Circuit, which prompted a jurisdictional
challenge from Holmes Group. 456 Despite this challenge, the Federal Circuit vacated
the District Court's judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration due to the
457
Supreme Court's decision in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.,
which resolved the Vornado I and Midwest Industries circuit split. 458

The Supreme

Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Federal Circuit has appellate

appellate exponent of patent law principles this court should play a leading role in
fashioning the rules specifying what patent law does and does not foreclose by
way of other legal remedies. If we simply follow regional circuit law in deciding
questions involving the interaction between patent law principles and other legal
remedies, other courts will not have the benefit of our analysis of the substance
and scope of patent law in such cases. Such abdication, we think, would in the
end disserve the interest in attaining coherence and consistency in the law
relating to patents.
Id. at 1361, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1019 (1999), overruledon other grounds byTrafFix Devices, Inc.,
v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1255 (2001); see infra note 457 (discussing Tralfix Devices).
451 Holmes Group, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 1143.
"The Tenth Circuit law upon which that judgment
[i.e., that Vornado was barred from claiming trade dress rights in its grill design] was based has not
changed since Vornado 1 and the court sees nothing to substantiate Vornado's hopeful speculation
that if the Tenth Circuit were to revisit the issue 'it would choose a different path than it articulated
in Vornado I.' Id. The district court recognized that it was possible that an appeal of their decision
could be routed to either the Tenth Circuit or the Federal Circuit, but stated that this possibility did
not affect their decision. "This court does not need to stray into this procedural thicket to decide the
issue before it. Regardless of which Court of Appeals would have jurisdiction, the court determines
that the principles of collateral estoppel should be applied in this case." Id. at n.2.
455 Holmes Group, 122 S. Ct. at 1892.
456

Id.

532 U.S. 23 (2001). TrafFix Devices, Inc. (TrafFix) v. Mktg. Displays, Inc. (MDI) involved
two manufacturers of temporary road sign stands, the "WindMaster" sign stands, sold by Marketing
Displays, and the competing "WindBuster" sign stands, sold by TrafFix. Id. at 26. MDI had
established a successful business making and selling the WindMaster stands, which incorporated a
patented dual-spring design that held the outdoor signs upright in adverse wind conditions. After
the patents expired, competing WindBuster stands showed up in the marketplace, and MDI pursued
trademark, trade dress, and unfair competition claims. There was no disagreement that the
products were similar. In the Supreme Court's words, the "products looked alike because they were.
When TrafFix started in business, it sent an MDI product abroad to have it reverse engineered, that
is to say copied." Id. The issue addressed by the Supreme Court was the effect of an expired patent
on a claim of trade dress infringement. Id. at 29. The Court concluded that a prior patent has valid
significance in resolving trade dress claims, because a utility patent provides strong evidence that
claimed features are functional. The Court held that MDI's trade dress claim was barred because
MDI could not carry the burden of overcoming the strong evidentiary inference of functionality
based on the disclosure of the dual-spring design in the claims of the expired patents. The Court
declined to address the issue of whether the Patent Clause of the Constitution prohibits the holder
of an expired utility patent from claiming trade dress protection, stating that when a case arose "in
which trade dress becomes the practical equivalent of an expired utility patent, that will be time
enough to consider the matter." Id. at 35.
458 13 Fed.Appx. 961 (Fed. Cir. 2001), 2001 WL 712760 (unpublished opinion).
457
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jurisdiction over a case in which the complaint does not allege a claim arising under
59
federal patent law, but the answer contains a patent law counterclaim.4
The Supreme Court began their analysis with an overview of the Federal
Circuit's jurisdictional statutes.
Congress gave the Federal Circuit exclusive
jurisdiction over appeals from a final decision of a district court if the jurisdiction of
that court was based in whole or in part on 28 U.S.C. § 1338.460 Section 1338 grants
original jurisdiction to the district courts on any civil action arising under federal
patent law. 461 In Christianson,the Supreme Court had determined that the wellpleaded complaint rule governed whether a case "arises under" federal law for
purposes of § 1338(a).462 As adapted to § 1338(a), the well-pleaded complaint rule
states that the determination of whether a case arises under patent law "must be
determined from what necessarily appears in the plaintiffs statement of his claim in
the bill or declaration.."463 Since a patent law claim had not been asserted in
Holmes Group's well pleaded complaint, the Supreme Court stated that the Federal
464
Circuit had erred in asserting jurisdiction over Vornado's appeal.
Vornado had argued that the well-pleaded complaint rule allows a counterclaim
to serve as a basis for a district court's "arising under" jurisdiction. 465 The Supreme
Court declined to interpret the rule so broadly. 466 The Court cited several cases as
precedent for this reasoning, including CaterpillarInc. v. Williams, which raised the
issue of whether a federal defense could establish "arising under" jurisdiction. 467 In
that case, the Court had concluded that federal jurisdiction generally exists "only
when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiffs properly pleaded
complaint." 468 The Court also cited The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., a case
decided in 1913, which stated that the determination of whether or not a case arises
under federal patent law "cannot depend upon the answer." 469 Applying that
reasoning, the Court concluded here that a counterclaim, which appears as part of
the defendant's answer rather than as part of the plaintiffs claim, could not serve as
the basis for "arising under" jurisdiction. 470 To do otherwise, concluded Justice
Scalia, would supercede the well pleaded complaint rule with an unwieldy "wellpleaded-complaint -or-counterclaim rule."471
459 [-olms Group, 122 S. Ct. at 1892.
460 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2000)).
401
402

Id. at 1893 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000)).
Id. (citing 486 U.S. at 808 (1998)). The statute that confers general federal-question

jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which gives district courts "original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). In
Christianson,the Supreme Court determined that "[1linguistic consistency" required the Court to
apply the same "arising under" test to both § 1331 and § 1338(a). Christianson,486 U.S. at 808.
See infra Part III.D.2 (discussing Christianson).
4 3 Holmes Group, 122 S. Ct. at 1893 (citing Christianson,486 U.S. at 809).
46 Id.
4 5 Id.
400( Id.

467

Id.

408

Id. (citing Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)).
Id. at 1894 (citing The Fairv. Kohier Die & Specialty Co, 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913)).

469
470
471

Id.
Id. Holmes Group had argued vigorously on this point, citing the Court's "nearly 100 year"

history of holding that a plaintiff who commences a civil action is "absolute master of what
jurisdiction he will appeal to." Reply Brief, Holmes Group Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation
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The Court supported their decision through several policy justifications. First,
the Court cited the longstanding policy that the plaintiff is the "master of the
complaint." 472 A plaintiff can ensure that his cause is heard in state court by
"eschewing claims based on federal law," because of the well-pleaded complaint
rule. 473 The Court said that Vornado's proposal would give more power to the
defendant, making him "master of the counterclaim" because he could defeat the
474
plaintiffs choice of forum by simply raising a federal counterclaim.
The Court also stated that allowing a counterclaim to establish "arising under"
jurisdiction could radically expand the class of removeable cases, contrary to the
"due regard for the rightful independence of state governments" that was required
pursuant to previous Supreme Court decisions. 475 Finally, the Court concluded that
the clarity and ease of administration of the well-pleaded complaint rule would be
compromised if the Court allowed responsive pleadings by the defendant to establish
"arising under" jurisdiction. 476
Vornado made a final stab with a policy argument of their own, arguing that
even if a counterclaim generally cannot establish the original "arising under"
jurisdiction of a district court, the Supreme Court should interpret the phrase
"arising under" differently when determining Federal Circuit jurisdiction. 477 Under
Vornado's analysis, Congress' goal of promoting the uniformity of patent law required
the Court to confer exclusive appellate jurisdiction on the Federal Circuit any time a
478
patent law counterclaim was raised.
The Supreme Court was not persuaded by this argument. According to Justice
Scalia, the Court's "task here is not to determine what would further Congress' goal
of ensuring patent law uniformity, but to determine what the words of the statute
must fairly be understood to mean."479 The problem, as viewed by the Court, was
that § 1295(a)(1) does not use the phrase "arising under." Instead, that statute refers
to jurisdiction under § 1338, "where it is well established that 'arising under any Act
of Congress relating to patents' invokes, specifically, the well-pleaded-complaint
rule." 48 0 Predictably not mincing words, Justice Scalia stated that "[it would be an
unprecedented feat of interpretive necromancy 481 to say that § 1338(a)'s 'arising
under' language means one thing (the well-pleaded-complaint rule) in its own right,
Sys., Inc., 2002 Westlaw 417307 (citing Healy v. Sea Gull Specialty Co., 237 U.S. 479, 480 (1915)
(Holmes Group, J.)). Vornado also cited the Court's explicit holding that "]urisdiction may not be
sustained on a theory that the plaintiff has not advanced." Id. (citing Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v.
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 809 n.6 (1986)). Vornado also cited Christiansonsholding that for a case
to arise under federal patent law, "the plaintiff must set up some right, title, or interest under the
patent laws, or at least make it appear that some right or privilege will be defeated by one
construction, or sustained by the opposite construction of these laws." Id.(citing Christianson,486
U.S. at 807-08) (quoting Pratt v. Paris Gaslight & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 259 (1897)).
472 Id.
473 Id.(citing

Caterpillar,482 U.S. at 388-89).

Id.
475 Id. (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 109 (1941)).
474

476Id.
477

Id.

478

Id., (citing Brief for Respondent 21).

479Id.at 1895.
480

Id.

"Necromancy" is divination by means of communication with the spirits of deceased
persons; black magic; sorcery. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 963 (4th ed. 2000).
481
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but something quite different ([Vornado's] complaint-or-counterclaim rule) when
referred to by § 1295(a)(1)."482 Since Holmes Group's complaint did not include any
claim based on patent law, the Court determined that the Federal Circuit did not
have jurisdiction over the case. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the
Federal Circuit and sent the case back to that court, with instructions to transfer the
48 3
case to the Tenth Circuit.
Justice Stevens concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. 48 4 Stevens did
not agree with the Court's statement that an interpretation of the "in whole or in
part" language of § 1295(a)(1) to encompass patent claims alleged in a compulsory
counterclaim providing an independent basis for the district court's jurisdiction
would be a "neologism" that would involve "an unprecedented feat of interpretive
necromancy." 48 5 Stevens was nonetheless persuaded that a correct interpretation of §
1295(a)(1) limited the Federal Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction to those cases in which
the patent claim is alleged in either the original complaint or an amended pleading
48 6
filed by the plaintiff.
Stevens also stated that each of the three policies identified by the Court as
supporting the well pleaded complaint rule governing district court jurisdiction also
pointed in the same direction with respect to appellate jurisdiction. 48 7 In Stevens's
view, the majority's interest in preserving the plaintiffs choice of forum included not
only the trial court but the appellate court as well.488 Secondly, Steven's pointed out
that the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit as defined in § 1295(a)(1) did not
include trademark and copyright claims, which are included in § 1338(a)'s grant of
jurisdiction. 48 9 Because patent cases frequently also involve other intellectual
property issues, there could be a potentially significant number of appeals routed to
the Federal Circuit involving subject matter that Congress specifically chose not to
place within the Federal Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction. 490 Finally, Stevens believed
that the interest in maintaining clarity and simplicity in the rules governing
appellate jurisdiction would be served by limiting the number of appeals required to
491
be reviewed by the Federal Circuit.
Justice Stevens concluded his concurring opinion by addressing the uniformity
issue. Citing Christianson, Stevens reiterated that the Court had already decided
that the Federal Circuit did not have exclusive jurisdiction over all cases raising
patent issues. 492 Stevens felt that was a good thing:
482
483

Holmes Group, 122 S. Ct. at 1895.
Id.

484 Id.

485Id.
486

Id.

487 Id.

488 Jd.
489
490

Id.
Id.

491Id.
492 Id. (citing Christianson, 486 U.S. at 811-12).
Justice Stevens stated that the Federal
Circuit had been granted appellate jurisdiction over cases involving patent law claims, not issues.
Id. at n.3. His comments echo those made in 1984 by then Federal Circuit Chief Justice Markey.
See supra note 143. Justice Stevens may also have viewed the Supreme Court's review of Holmes
Group as an opportunity to address other recent Federal Circuit behavioral patterns. See Janice M.
Mueller, "InterpretiveNecromancy" or PrudentPatentPoliey? The Supreme Court's 'Arising Under"
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Necessarily, therefore, other circuits will have some role to play in the
development of this area of the law. An occasional conflict in decisions may
be useful in identifying questions that merit this Court's attention.
Moreover, occasional decisions by courts with broader jurisdiction will
provide an antidote to the risk that the specialized court may develop an
493
institutional bias.
494
Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment, joined by Justice O'Connor.
Ginsburg agreed with the rationale of former Chief Justice Markey in AerojetGeneral Corp. v. Machine Too] Works, Oerlikon-Buebrle Ltd.495 that when a claim
arises under patent law and is adjudicated on its merits by a federal district court,
the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over that adjudication, and
other determinations made in the same case. 496 Justice Ginsburg cited Markey's
Aerojet-General observation that "a patent infringement counterclaim, unlike a
patent issue raised only as a defense, has as its own, independent jurisdictional base
28 U.S.C. § 1338, i.e., such a claim discretely 'arises under the patent laws."' 497 In
Ginsburg's opinion, the issue was not the plaintiffs choice of trial forum, but rather
498
Congress's allocation of adjudicatory authority among the federal courts of appeals:

At that appellate level, Congress sought to eliminate forum shopping and to
advance uniformity in the interpretation and application of federal patent
law. The Court's opinion dwells on district court authority. But, all agree
Congress left that authority entirely untouched. I would attend, instead, to
the unique context at issue, and give effect to Congress' endeavor to grant
the Federal Circuit exclusive appellate jurisdiction at least over district
499
court adjudications of patent claims.
Ginsburg joined in the Court's opinion, however, because no patent claim was
50 0
actually adjudicated.
With this decision, the Supreme Court turned the patent world upside down.
After years of effectively reigning alone in the patent law appellate arena, the
Blunder in Holmes Group v. Vornado, 2 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 57, 68 (2002)
(suggesting that Justice Stevens may have been viewed the Court's decision in Holmes Group as an
opportunity to restrain the Federal Circuit from a perceived improper expansion of its authority
through the court's recent choice-of-law jurisprudence in 1999's Midwest Industries); see supra note
453 and accompanying text.
493Holmes Group, 122 S. Ct. at 1898. It is interesting to note Justice Stevens' reference to the
Federal Circuit as a "specialized court," despite language to the contrary in the court's legislative
history, and attempts by former Federal Circuit Chief Judges to rid the court of that label. See
supra notes 64 and 65 and accompanying text.
494Id.
495 895

F.2d 736 (1990).
Holmes Group, 122 S. Ct. at 1898.
497Id. (citing AerojetGeneral Corp., 895 F.2d at 741-44).
496

498Id.
49 Id. (citing R. Dreyfuss, The FederalCircuit:A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1, 30-37 (1989)).
o00Id.
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Federal Circuit was now being told by the Supreme Court to move over and make
room for the regional circuit courts of appeal. It did not take long for this uneasy
menage A trois to become a reality. The Court's decision in Holmes Group has
already been applied to grant jurisdiction over certain patent appeals to the regional
circuits. Within three weeks of the Court's decision, the Federal Circuit transferred a
patent appeal to the Seventh Circuit. 50 1 The Eleventh Circuit received a second case
from the Federal Circuit the following week. 50 2 The menage A trois may actually be a
menage A quatre: a lower court has interpreted the Supreme Court's decision as
granting jurisdiction to state courts over patent claims, despite the long-standing
practice that these types of claims were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
50 3
federal courts.
Holmes Group may be analyzed from various perspectives. First, Justice Scalia
based the majority's ruling in Holmes Group on a literal parsing of the jurisdictional
statutes involved. The Court was not swayed by arguments that its opinion would
frustrate Congress's intent to bring stability and uniformity to patent law
jurisprudence and reduce the rampant forum shopping that had typified patent
litigation prior to 1982.504 Justice Scalia's wholesale refusal to consider legislative
intent has prompted both negative commentary 505 and swift defensive acts by patent
law practitioners. For example, one federal bar association responded by quickly

501Medigene AG v. Loyola Univ., 2002 WL 1478674 (Fed. Cir. June 27, 2002).
502 Telecomm Technical Servs. Inc. v. Siemens Rolm Comms. Inc., 2002 WL 1425237 (Fed. Cir.
July 2, 2002).
503 Green v. Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., 770 N.E.2d 784 (Ind.2002). In that case, the court
held that where the plaintiffs claims are entirely non-federal (e.g., for breach of contract) and the
defendant counterclaims for patent infringement, federal courts may no longer have jurisdiction
over the civil action, absent diversity:
The only basis for concluding that a state court may not entertain patent or
copyright counterclaims is the exclusive jurisdiction conferred by section 1338
over "any civil action arising under" the patent or copyright laws. A counterclaim
under those laws does not fall within that language. Holmes teaches that what
Congress said - not what it intended - is controlling here .... Accordingly, we
think Holmes requires us to reject the federal authorities stating or implying that
a state court may not entertain a counterclaim under patent or copyright law.
Id. at 793 (citations omitted).
504 Holmes Group, 122 S. Ct. at 1895. For discussions of forum shopping in patent cases see
Robert P. Taylor, Now Dawn for Forum Shopping: The Implications of Vornado, THE ANTITRUST
SOURCE (Nov. 2002); Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases.*Does GeographicChoice
Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889 (2001) in which a large-scale empirical analysis of patent
enforcement in district courts was undertaken and it was concluded that choice of forum continues
to play a critical role in the outcome of patent litigation.
505 See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 492, at 59:
The decision in Holmes Group resurrects the specter of regional circuit specific,
non uniform patent jurisprudence and the potential for forum shopping that
entails, the very problems that the Federal Circuit was created to remedy. By
narrowly construing statutory text and non-analogous judicial decisions while
purposefully ignoring the legislative intent expressed in the Federal Court
Improvement Act of 1982, the Supreme Court in Holmes Group has frustrated
Congress's goal of creating a more uniform and stable patent law jurisprudence.

[2:201 2003]

John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

forming an ad hoc committee to analyze the case and propose solutions to the
5°6
practical problems raised by the Holmes Group decision.
Second, Justice Scalia's decision wreaked havoc with articulated Supreme Court
concerns and existing contrary Federal Circuit decisions. In Festo, decided just a
week before Holmes Group, the Court had delivered a terse verbal slap to the Federal
Circuit because of that court's ignorance of "the guidance of Warner-Jenkinson,
which instructed the courts to be cautious before adopting changes that disrupt the
settled expectations of the inventing community."507 Yet the same Supreme Court,
one week later, threw caution to the wind and chose itself to blithely adopt a major
change that has already disrupted the settled expectations of the inventing
community.
The Court's decision also overruled existing contrary Federal Circuit decisions
that had established that the Federal Circuit had appellate jurisdiction over appeals
from cases involving patent infringement counterclaims, whether permissive or
compulsory. 50 8 In Aerojet-General Corp., which was cited by both Stevens and
Ginsburg in their concurring opinions, then-Chief Judge Markey had interpreted the
well-pleaded complaint rule of Christianson as a rule of well-pleaded complaint or
counterclaim.
Markey stated that to read the well-pleaded complaint rule as
mandating "a compelled disregard of compulsory counterclaims for patent
infringement . . . would disserve the intent of Congress in creating [the Federal
Circuit] ."509

506 The Federal Circuit Bar Association (FCBA) has proposed a legislative solution, suggesting
that 28 U.S.C. § 1338 be amended to read that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action involving any claim for reliefarisingunder any Act of Congress relating to patents,
plant variety protection, copyrights and trademarks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the
courts of the states in patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases." (proposed text in italics).
The FCBA articulated several advantages that would result from an amendment to the statute. The
proposed language would minimize additions and deletions to existing statutory language; exploit
the fact that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 defines "claim for relief' broadly to include "an
original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third part claim;" clarify that federal courts shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over all claims for relief arising under the patent laws by breaking the wooden

application of the well-pleaded complaint rule to this statute; and ensure Federal Circuit jurisdiction
over all appeals from civil actions in which either party asserted a claim for relief arising under the
patent laws. See Ad Hoc Committee to Study Holmes Group Group v. Vornado Air Circulation
Systems, Committee Report 1-6, Federal Circuit Bar Association (Sept. 11, 2002).
507 See supra note 426 and accompanying text.
50S Mueller, supra note 492, at 58.
509 Id. (citing Aerojet-General Corp., 895 F.2d at 745). Judge Markey did seem to recognize
some "occasional" role for the regional circuits and state courts in patent law cases, but his language
suggests that their role would be minimal:
As said in Atari, achievement of increased uniformity in the substantive law of
patents does not require that this court get its hands on every appeal involving an
allegation that a patent law issue is somehow involved. Congress was not
concerned that an occasional patent law decision of a regional circuit court, or of a
state court, would defeat its goal of increased uniformity in the national law of
patents. The regional circuits are, of course, perfectly competent, as are state
courts, to determine patent "questions" or "issues" that may occasionally arise in
cases within their jurisdiction. "Uniformity" is not necessarily thereby abandoned.
Christianson,822 F.2d at 1552 (quoting Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc. 747 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir.
1984)) (citations omitted).
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Finally, the majority opinion has been criticized for applying case law
interpreting § 1331's "arising under" terminology in the context of attempted
removals from state to federal court, and then concluding that the appeal had been
taken to the wrong federal appellate forum. 5 10 Justice Scalia expressed concern that
cases originally brought in state court could be removed to federal court upon the
assertion of a counterclaim for patent infringement, thus allowing a defendant to
"radically expand the class of removable cases." 511 Each of the authorities cited by
Justice Scalia in support of this point, however, turn on federalism concerns. 512 The
Court arguably erred by relying on the policy concerns of state sovereignty and the
preservation of stable federal-state relations (an issue under 28 U.S.C. § 1331)
instead of viewing the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction in conjunction with
513
Congress'purpose in creating the court.
It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of the Court's decision in
this case. In one swift move, the Court undermined the role and effectiveness of the
Federal Circuit in patent law issues. The tone of the decision was not completely
unexpected, when viewed in concert with other recent Court rulings in patent cases.
The conclusion, however, was not expected. No one expected the patent community
in 2002 to be facing the same uniformity and forum-shopping hurdles that had been
in place before the Federal Circuit's creation in 1982. Although the full effect of
Holmes Group remains to be seen, it now appears that the once relatively serene
consanguinity between the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit has been replaced by
a confusing and rather crowded relationship.

VI. CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit debuted in 1982 with the blessing of Congress, the Supreme
Court, and both Democratic (Carter) and Republican (Reagan) presidential
administrations. The new court was armed with a confident and capable Chief
Judge, a staff of judges experienced in patent law, and a mandate to improve the
administration of specified federal laws, especially patent laws. This certainly
seemed to be a marriage made in heaven.
With such a blessed beginning, one can understand why the Federal Circuit
assumed it was destined to lead the nation's courts in patent law jurisprudence.
That assumption, however, was wrong. The Federal Circuit has neither the
Constitutional authority nor the Congressional mandate to be the final arbiter of
patent law. The Federal Circuit is "just" an intermediate circuit court of appeal,
albeit one with unique jurisdiction. Like all the other Circuit Courts of Appeal, the
Federal Circuit must answer to a higher judicial authority.
The Supreme Court in 1982 may have been content to sit back and leave patent
jurisprudence to the Federal Circuit, but twenty years makes a difference in virtually
510 Mueller, supra note 492, at 62.
511
Holmes Group, 122 S. Ct. at 1894.
512 Mueller, supra note 492, at 63.
513 Id. at 65 (arguing that different concerns surround the "arising under" language of 28
U.S.C. § 1331 and the "arising under" language of 28 U.S.C. § 1338; the latter must be read in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a), which links the two provisions for purposes of determining the
Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction).
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every relationship.
The Supreme Court's two unanimous decisions in 2002
overruling Federal Circuit patent cases demonstrate that the Court's patience toward
the Federal Circuit is wearing thin. No relationship can endure if one party refuses
to hear what the other one is saying, and in this case, the message is loud and clear:
the Federal Circuit does not, and never had, exclusive jurisdiction over patent issues.
The sooner the Federal Circuit realizes this, the sooner this brokered marriage can
be saved.

